NEW TIMES

Vladimir Bukovsky **reminisces**

April 9–15, 1991

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A SOVIET WEEKLY OF ORLD AFFAIRS

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
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A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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NATION

POLITICAL LIFE *Ya. Rakhmanova* **OVERHEARD ON TVERSKAYA STREET** 4

D. Volkogonov **CROMWELL, PETER THE GREAT, ...GORBACHEV?** 6

M. Shakina **STALEMATE** 7

L. Shevtsova **LIGHT IN THE END OF THE TUNNEL** 8

OBSERVER'S VIEW *L. Bezymensky* **A CHANCE FOR CIVIC CONCORD** 9

REFLECTIONS *G. Sidorova* **SHARING POWER** 10

ECONOMICS *A. Matlin* **A NEW VICTORY FOR BUREAUCRACY** 12

WORLD

POLEMICS *S. Akhromeyev* **REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY?** 14

YUGOSLAVIA *G. Sysoyev* **HOW TO GET OUT OF COMMUNISM SMARTER** 20

GERMANY *M. Podvigin* **BONN OR BERLIN?** 21

USSR–JAPAN *A. Bogaturov*

THE FIRST STEP IS MADE BY THE STRONGER PARTY 22

SOUTH AFRICA *N. Reshetnyak* **RUSSIAN EASTER IN JOHANNESBURG** 25

PAST AND PRESENT *L. Mlechin* **THE RED BROTHERHOOD** 26

THIRD BASKET

HUMAN RIGHTS *L. Yelin – V. Bukovsky* **A SUSPENDED VISIT** 30

PAST AND PRESENT *A. Larin* **SENTENCED TO MURDER** 34

ART *N. Zorkaya* **THE UNFORGETTABLE TARKOVSKY** 36

DESTINIES *G. Arbatov* **PAINFUL QUESTIONS FOR AN ACHING HEART** 38

MANUSCRIPTS DO NOT BURN *P. Sorokin* **THE LAND OF THE EMPTY BELLY** 40

SOCIOLOGIST'S DIARY *L. Ionin* **THE LOFTY NAME "POLITICAL SCIENTIST"** 43

LITERATURE *A. Adzhubei* **AND FEAR PARALYSES THOUGHT** 46

LAUGHTER THROUGH TEARS *L. Likhodeyev* **WHAT'S THE MAN EATING, DAD?** 48

FROM OUR MAILBAG **(2)**, PEOPLE **(44)**



Dramas at the Russian Congress

p. 4

Marshal Akhromeyev: our guest following criticizm

p. 14

The gift of foresight of Andrei Tarkovsky

p. 36

Cover by Victor Brel

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From our mailbag

■ Thank you for publishing my letter (No.5/91) in which I wrote about my numerous attempts to visit the Soviet Union – my native land. Each time the Soviet consulate gave me the thumbs down without giving any explanations. The publication of your letter has had a magical effect. No sooner did the issue of the magazine reach Washington than they hinted to me at the consulate that I was no longer persona non grata: the ban on my trip to the Soviet Union had been lifted. I have already received the visa and in a month I'll be in Moscow. I have gathered from conversations with the Embassy staff that not only do they read your magazine, but they are also afraid of it. After all, glasnost is no laughing matter.

Semion Reznik
Washington, USA

■ Although I live in a "remote place," I nevertheless venture to speak about the conversation between Mark Neimark, D.Sc. (History), and one of the leaders of the 4th International, Ernst Mandel.

To explain our crisis by the Utopian nature of Marxism and socialism is to be lacking in conscientiousness, to say the least. As a result of Stalin's bloody coup, people in this country have been forcibly alienated from power and property (that is, from socialism). Ernst Mandel has a point in saying that: "If socialism and communism return to the ideals that inspired them in the beginning, they will be invincible."

Economic programmes are oriented towards a market. But such an orientation lacks a scientific basis. At the same time they also call to witness Lenin ascribing to him the rejection of the people's socialism and the need to come over to the positions of a cooperative system. But Lenin proposed a system of civilized cooperators with **public ownership** of the means of production. Therefore, I think that our state and party leaders are not advocates of Leninist theory and ideology. They deviate from Leninism to the right, standing closer to Social Democrats. Socialism in this country should be built, not renewed, and we have a good initial base represented by the integral national economy to fulfil this task.

The people can win power that has been usurped from them not by means of reforms, but only as a result of a revolution. Ernst Mandel is right in speaking of the need for "a political anti-bureaucratic revolution in the countries that are usually called 'socialist.'"

V.Kornienko,
D. Sc. (Economics)
Kiev, USSR

■ Our press features a lot of articles whose authors make a song and dance about the "Polish miracle." I have been living in Poland for five years and I have had an opportunity to see that "miracle" for myself. A public opinion poll showed that only 3 percent of Poles think that their life is good and 79 percent assess the situation as very bad. Now about the election of the president. Some unknown Tyminski has given the boot to all of Solidarity. He appeared in Poland just 10 days before the official registration of candidates. His programme was the most conservative one – at least by the standards of our radicals. Stanislaw Tyminski is against unrestrained privatization, he does not blame Wojciech Jaruzelski and is the only candidate who accepted the invitation of our ambassador to take part in the

The Baltics: the view from the West

■ Taken aback by unexpectedly strong international indignation, Moscow is pausing in its crackdown on the democratic movements in the Baltic republics. The world's democracies can make a resumption of the Kremlin's repression in the Baltics politically even more costly if they now respond with action in multilateral forums as well as with bilateral measures. Indeed, given both Moscow's recent warm embrace of international institutions and the reluctance of the Bush administration to risk recent gains in Soviet-American relations by strong unilateral sanctions, multilateral options may be the best available.

Some corrective pressures can be exerted in regional forums, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other pressures to nudge Moscow back on the path toward democratization should be pursued in a variety of United Nations bodies. After all, it was Mikhail Gorbachev himself who signaled the resurgence of the UN when, in 1987, he issued a statement that placed the world body at the center of a new, "comprehensive" system of international peace and security.

No one expects the Security Council to take up the question of Soviet actions in the Baltic republics. The USSR would veto any Council action, insisting that the crackdowns in the republics are an internal affair. More fruitful places for bringing international pressure to bear are the UN's human rights bodies, UNESCO, the World Bank, and the World Court.

During the heyday of glasnost, Moscow accepted the World Court's jurisdiction over disputes about the circumstances in which UN human rights treaties apply, and it declared that international standards were to be the yardstick for measuring Soviet human rights performance. Members of the UN Human Rights Commission should announce their intention to subject Moscow's assaults in Vilnius and Riga to close commission scrutiny. Having ratified the international covenant on civil and political rights, the Soviet government is accountable to the UN for any breach of treaty obligations. A UN fact-finder should not have a hard time finding in those assaults violations of such convenant mandates as "freedom of expression," the "right of peaceful assembly," and the "right of self-determination" by which peoples "freely determine their political status."

An especially alarming shift in Moscow's mood in January was signaled by Gorbachev's call for reapeal of new legislation guaranteeing press freedom. The Stalinist chill is already being felt in Soviet broadcasting

The "Polish miracle" through the eyes of a Soviet soldier

Is the Trotskyite Mandel right?

The issue of the legal status of the Baltics can be refferred to the World Court



Drawing by Evgeny Sinichinov

celebration of the October Revolution.

Do you know how vexing it is to listen on their television to vulgar and offensive jokes about us? For example, as the news about an Aeroflot plane crash is followed by sequences about the departure of the USSR president, the voice off screen says: "Thus time, for sure, everything will be O.K." And this happens every day. Inscriptions in big letters on the walls of houses read: "Annihilate the USSR." And this is not to mention the obscene language in Russian that constantly hurts the ears of our women and children; for the time being they don't dare to harass men, especialy those who look sturdy. But whom am I writing to about all this? You are proud of your role as gravediggers. What do you care about the groaning of the tormented soul of a "splinter of imperial thinking"! Only one should have a sense of proportion in everything. Poland reacts to attacks against it with all sorts of notes, declarations and angry publications. And we have lost both our honour and our conscience. America is a big country, but there is no room for everyone there. We must raise up from the ruins our native land.

N.Kravchenko
field post office

■ The article "The second revolution" by Vasilyev (No.45/90) is a timely and necessary publication. But I cannot agree with some of its principal points.

"A great country... was brutally repressed in the name of the great goals of setting up Marxist socialism." How should one understand "repressed"? We were alone and had to learn how to build socialism in a petty peasants' country – for the world revolution had not taken place.

I cannot agree more with a number of the article's propositions of principle. Indeed, "Marx's theory evolved together with its creator, but still lagged dramatically behind the march of history."

Let me thank you once more for a wonderful article.

Your permanent reader
Valeri Pochepko,
Cand. Sc. (Philosophy)
Leningrad, USSR

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

– which should trigger action in another UN forum. Communication policy is a major concern of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which in 1989 rededicated itself after long controversy, and with Soviet endorsement, to the free flow of information. Since UNESCO's rules allow any affected party to file a complaint of rights violations in one of the agency's fields of responsibility, the Lithuanian government should activate the agency's confidential hearing machinery with a formal complaint about the brutal takeover of its broadcasting facilities. Citing the restrictions reimposed on Soviet television news, individual Soviet journalists can trigger an inquiry into government violations of freedom of information.

UNESCO member states (of which the United States is not one) should insist on an immediate statement from top UNESCO officials calling for the restoration of free broadcasting in the Soviet Union. Ironically, just last year UNESCO put at the helm of its communication programme an ethnic Lithuanian, who had been deputy director of Soviet television. He could use his position to speak to the Soviets with special authority about the obligation to guarantee media freedom, in fulfilment of his UNESCO responsibilities.

Through such measures the world community can apply preemptive political pressure on Soviet authorities before the die of repression is cast. The leverage of international bodies is not great, but they lend global legitimacy to the struggle against repression, usefully reinforcing any unilateral actions of Western governments.

Of course, economic realities will carry more weight with Soviet hardliners than will public embarrassment. The European Community and Washington policy-makers are right to warn of cutting off the bilateral aid promised to Gorbachev's government, but here too they should also be thinking multilaterally. The Soviet Union, anxious to gain access to substantial new capital, is now eager to join the World Bank. Brussels, Tokyo, and Washington, with the largest blocs of Bank votes, should announce their opposition to Moscow's membership so long as repression in the republics continues.

The Soviet authorities like to claim that the problems in the Baltics are simply an internal affair, even as the Balts argue that the disputes are in fact international, given Stalin's forcible annexation of their states. The legal status of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is precisely the kind of issue that can usefully be referred to the World Court. If the three Baltic republics were to apply for UN membership, the Security Council could ask the Court for its advisory opinion on their claims to statehood. Focusing international attention on the legality of the annexations would keep the issue on the front burner. (The actual decision on UN membership would, however, be subject to Soviet veto in the Security Council.)

In recent years Gorbachev himself has invited the UN to take the lead in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The world community should do just that in all the relevant bodies of the UN system to protect the peoples of the Soviet Union's republics during this time of troubles – even if those in the Kremlin may now have second thoughts.

Jeffrey Laurenti,
Toby Trister Gati,
the United Nations Association
of the United States

New York, USA

The congress which set the whole of Russia in motion has ended with no result.

A presidency has not been introduced in Russia but Yeltsin's popularity has soared once again.

Politicians are invited for a round-table discussion, while voters stare at their empty dinner tables after the dramatic price hike.

Moscow, March 28

Photos by Yuri Inyakin and Vladimir Svartsevich

POLITICAL LIFE

Overheard on Tverskaya Street

After troops moved in Moscow

"Did you see it? They've got shields and helmets and bullet-proof vests..."

"Occupiers!"

"Don't call them that! They're not the guilty ones!"

"You must be hungry, sonnies! Have some rolls, I've got a whole bag of them. My son's in the army too. Have some rolls. Come on, have some!"

"They can't, they're on duty..."

"Will you shoot at us if you are ordered to?"

"I would have talked to you in a different place and in a different situation. I can't talk to you now..."

"Long live the riot police! Hurrah!"

"Shame on you!"

"Long live the Soviet police! Hurrah!"

"Why are you so indignant? Soviet police are good guys. The problem is they are given bad orders."

"Right! Don't insult the police!"

"Hey Pugo, don't try to scare us. We are the people. Don't try to scare us. Let's chant it together!"

Someone begins singing a folk song.

"Pugo, don't try to scare us!"

"Comrades, the Communists have turned me into a pauper! Please, give something to a CPSU victim! I have been a CPSU member for forty years. I'll sing for you..."

"Dear Muscovites... The balcony of Stanislavsky Theatre is in poor condition. We will have to find another place for the speakers' platform. The meeting will take place anyway. In Mayakovsky Square..."

"Will you march in front?"

"Sure!"

"You're crazy! Women, come back here. Back, I say! Men move to the front!"

"People's deputies! Will you march in the front ranks, please!"

"Citizens, let us form the front row..."

"Where will we march?"

"To Pushkin Square. We'll try to break through to Manezh Square."

"They say we are to go to Mayakovsky..."

"Citizens! The CPSU is the plague of the 20th century!"

"Right! Right!"

"Shame! Shame! Shame!"

"Dear Muscovites! A people's deputy is speaking... We have not been able to talk the military into letting us gather in Manezh Square. The meeting will be held in Mayakovsky..." You'll be addressed by people's deputies..."

"God, they wouldn't let me pass through to go home! The soldiers are asking to see my passport with the residence registration. I've never thought living in the centre would be such a problem!"

"Tanks, tanks!!!"

"Where did you see tanks? Why raise a panic? These are fire pumps."

"Is something burning?"

"Why are you just standing there, blokes? Let's try and break through the cordons."

"What if they start shooting?"

"Let them shoot! I've seen worse! I won't go away! I'll throw myself under the tanks! Why don't they let me onto Manezh? This is my city, not theirs. They have to go!"

"Right! It's a violation of the Constitution!"

"Are you crazy, woman? Why throw yourself under a tank? Think about your children..."

"I don't want my kids to see what I am seeing..."

"Quiet, quiet. Let's not get so excited. Look at the troops: they are our kids too. They're not to blame."

"Cowards. You men are cowards..."

"We ain't cowards! The troops are here to scare the fainthearted. You attack them and they'll grab you. And then they'll announce to the whole world that the democrats started riots. Provoked bloodshed. They can't wait to twist our arms..."

"Gorbachev resign!"

"Resign! Resign! Resign!"

"Pavlov resign!"

"What's the sense in our shouting here?"

"Do you think it's wiser to keep silent? To let these bastards treat you like rubbish?"

"Bastards! Here is their 'renewed union with the respect for human rights'!"

"They've grown brazen after the referendum. They think that if most voters voted for the union, they can now shoot us all..."

"You watch your tongue. There are too many plainclothes democrats in the crowd..."

"I've seen them. They don't even try to hide the walkie-talkies..."

"Look, they are bringing in more troops!"

"They are playing it tough, the bastards! Look how they march!"

"They are showing muscle before the price hike. They want us to know what they can do..."

"Shame! Shame! Shame!"

"Pavlov resign!"

"USSR parliament resign!"

"We want a law to recall people's deputies!"

"Support Yeltsin!"

"Yeltsin! Yeltsin! Yeltsin!"

"One ruble a minute!"

"For what?"

"You climb onto my shoulders so you can look over the cordons. And you girlie can climb onto me for free..."

"What's there?"

"There are missiles by the Telegraph Building."

"Missiles?!"

"Why scare people? There aren't any missiles there."

"It was only a joke..."

"Say no to the Pavlov government! Say yes to a coalition government!"

"Communists, let the Russian parliament work!"

"The CPSU's place is on the trash heap of history!"

"Look, granny, you must be cold as ice already. You'd better go home."

"My old man sent me here, sonny. He can't come himself: he can't walk."

"It's for the young to come to meetings, granny."

"No, sonny. My old man and me, we know what's right and what's wrong. It's no good sending troops against people. What a shame! How dare they look us in the eye after that!"

"They will not look us in the eye. They wouldn't have called in troops to look us in the eye."

"Just think of it! Those twenty-nine deputies set the whole city astir! What does Gorbachev think he's doing?"

"Mom, lift me higher, I want to see. May I touch this shield? Will you buy me a shield like this, Mom? And a helmet, and a club..."

"No, darling. You will never have such things."

"Why?"

"You will never fight your own people. It is only the government that uses clubs against us because the government hates and fears us..."

"Don't tell all this to him. He's still too young to understand..."

"Let him know. That's why I

brought him here."

"Respected fellow citizens! Support the striking miners! Hurrah!"

"Do you know they are raising money for the miners?"

"I'm afraid the money will vanish like it has many times..."

"I don't think so."

"They also collect money for Demokraticheskaya Rossiya."

"I'm sick and tired of all this money-raising..."

"Well, I really don't know if we can trust them. OK, I have given some money after all."

"The miners are doing the right thing..."

"They are, and the metalworkers support them."

"The main thing is that they have put forward political demands..."

"But how do you like that crook Kravchenko?"

"That's whom Gorbachev needs as aides, people like Kravchenko, and Pavlov and Pugo and Kryuchkov..."

"A nice gang, isn't it?"

"I didn't really like demonstrations: I don't like big crowds. I did support democrats before, but it was not until recently that I realized I had to go out to the street to protest."

"There was at least some hope before."

"There is no way against them!"

"They just spit on us. All they care about is their own skin. And it's so easy to gag us..."

"We must take to the streets. We must demonstrate, protest..."

"It may be war."

"Look how many reporters have come."

"Look at those three... Dressed as if for the North Pole."

"The overall he wears is real quality."

"They're from CNN."

"How do you know?"

"He's got an ID card on his breast pocket..."

"Why are so many tankers here?"

"To disperse the crowds."

"With petrol?!"

"There is only water in them."

"Do you see the water cannons over there? The red ones?..."

"Just think of it! What a waste! So much fuel burned for nothing! So much money wasted!"

"What are they showing to the camera?"

"It's the V-sign, meaning 'victory', 'freedom'..."

"Esteemed Muscovites! A people's deputy is going to address you..."

"Make way, make way..."

"...The feast of Easter..."

"The meeting's over, dear citizens. Thank you for your support."

"Shall we go now?"

"Let's stay for a while..."

Reported by
Yaroslava Rakhmanova

Confrontation in the streets, confrontation at the congress. Boris Yeltsin remains the eye of the political hurricane – popular as never before

Cromwell, Peter the Great,... Gorbachev?

People's Deputy **Dmitry VOLKOGONOV** talks to *New Times* parliamentary correspondent Gennady Ariyevich about the recently ended extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

I am convinced that such congresses cannot be productive. One can't expect anything from them. This is true of both the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and republican congresses as well. They are unable to take really important decisions. I do not think they will last longer than the current deputies' mandates.

This congress has demonstrated the extreme political division in society. Ideological differences have aggravated. In my opinion, ideological difference must be forgotten for a while: there is really no point in speaking about socialism or capitalism or communism. We must speak about the construction of a democratic civilized society. The leaders' incantations about the socialist choice and communist future must be confined to social sciences textbooks. The current situation in this country is the result of decades of political monopoly of one party, the result of the dominance of one ideology.

However, despite the complexity of the situation, I do not think all the possibilities of a compromise have been exhausted. There are problems on which all factions agree. One such problem is unity of Russia. There are other vital issues on which the sides could reach a consensus. We have one country, one land, one life and one destiny. The Soviet Union had managed to make peace even with Churchill whom Lenin called the archenemy of Soviet power, when this country was in mortal danger. On June 22, 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia, Churchill voiced his support and Stalin responded with gratitude. Doesn't the current danger command concord? The crisis we are living through is the test of the parliamentarians' political wisdom.

We do not have a choice. We must confer, as soon as possible, at the round table and negotiate concrete problems. The absence of a clearly-defined centre makes the situation even more difficult. There is a left-wing camp and there is a right-wing camp, but there is no strong centre. Our faction Left Centre is trying to fill in this gap. The faction includes about 100 deputies at the congress and 30 members of the Supreme Soviet. It is a liberal-democratic group. Liberals are good when they are in the opposition, not in power. Liberals lack firmness. Remember the debates about ownership of land? It was our faction that suggested a compromise solution that was adopted by the congress.

Why Left Centre? As a historian and philosopher, I know that all progressive reforms were carried out when the leaders and major political forces shifted to the left from the centre. Any time the left or the right won, there were civil wars, or terror or dictatorship. Cromwell and Peter the Great were more left than the centre. They were radical enough, but they never lost the sense of proportion and responsibility. Gorbachev was also to the left of the centre, then he shifted to the centre and is now drifting to the right.

Which side will be the first to meet the opponents halfway? Both sides should, but the one which possesses more power can find it easier to make a compromise.

I remember the French military code of conduct. Who salutes first when two colonels meet? The answer is quintessentially French: the colonel who is more well-mannered. If only our politicians followed this rule.

Stalemate

The Communists have failed to topple Yeltsin. The democrats have failed to make him president

Marina Shakina

The Second Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation was convened on the initiative of the parliamentary faction Kommunisty Rossii (Communists of Russia). The troops were brought into Moscow after 29 deputies, mostly representing Kommunisty Rossii complained that pro-democracy activists of the Moscow electorate had been applying psychological pressure to them. The main topic at the Congress was defined as "the socio-economic condition of Russia" and was actually a euphemism for the Communists' intent to castigate Yeltsin.

The Soviet Army and the USSR Cabinet came to Yeltsin's rescue at the time he needed it most.

The clumsy and stupid joint demarche by Kommunisty Rossii and the Kremlin once again touched off a massive wave of support for the leader of Russia. The people's reaction to the deployment of troops around the Kremlin produced "psychological pressure" hundreds of times stronger than that of which the 29 deputies had complained.

The complaint by the 29 deputies stirred the memories of the appeal issued by Lithuania's self-proclaimed National Salvation Committee to the commander of the Vilnius garrison. In Vilnius the troops were deployed under the pretext that Lithuanian TV was broadcasting "anti-Soviet" programmes. Moscow TV did not give grounds for such an appeal, of course, and a different pretext had to be and was found: psychological pressure placed on people's deputies.

Some 10,000 people gathered outside the Government House in Tbilisi on that fateful night of April 9. Usually hardly more than 500 people gathered there to support the students on a hunger strike. Why did so many people come? The day before, a column of tanks paraded across the city in order to intimidate the people. This arrogant show of force proved to be counterproductive, and people gathered from all over Tbilisi to express solidarity with the strikers.

Similarly, the show of force in Vilnius was also counterproductive and people gathered around the Parliament Building to protect their deputies, if only by their silent presence.

Something like this happened in Moscow. Despite the oppressive atmosphere in the capital, the endless columns of heavy army trucks, vehicle tankers and khaki-coloured lorries blocking the approaches to the city's centre, Muscovites staged two meetings in support of Yeltsin: one in the Arbatskaya Square and the other near the Stanislavsky Theatre on Tverskaya Street.

It turned out that Yeltsin's opponents from the Communist faction were absolutely unprepared for a serious dialogue.

Both Yeltsin and his premier, Ivan Silayev, presented concrete suggestions and programmes. Their speeches were calm, restrained and even emphatically unemotional. Nothing like this can be said about the Communists' speeches: all of them were nothing but sheer social demagogy, accusations against Yeltsin, laments and personal grudges.



Vladimir Isakov – one of the anti-Yeltsin Six, Anatoly Malykhin – leader of the striking miners of Kuzbas, Ivan Polozkov – he said the Communists had no intention to oust Yeltsin from power

What was there in the report of Vladimir Isakov? The report that Communists wanted so much to see included in the agenda? What was there except the desire to have Gorbachev ousted and exiled as an ambassador to a far-off country? What might be described as the Communist faction's proposals was nothing but the painfully familiar "to instruct...", "to work out..." and "to instruct to work out..."

The economic programme of the Communist faction boils down to restoration of economic discipline. The sallies and intrigues of the democrats were singled out as the sole cause of the current crisis. The only political creed of the Communist faction was that Yeltsin was wrong.

The Congress demonstrated that Communists who had initiated it dramatically lacked fresh ideas. They must have lost touch with reality if they seriously believe that today's emancipated voters would buy such arguments and such a mentality.

The aggressiveness repeatedly demonstrated by the Communists seems to be the flip side of fear. There has been much talk recently about possible repressions of Communists, about wild crowds flooding into the streets, seizing power and killing those who would dare disagree. All these speculations are coming from Communists who ascribe such sinister plans to the democrats, scare themselves... and call in tanks.

The Congress demonstrated that Communists would readily ignore the will of their voters – support for Russia's own presidency, solidarity with the striking miners, the demands for a law allowing the recall of deputies – because they continue to believe themselves to be the vanguard knowing the one and only way to the communist tomorrow.

The Congress highlighted the stalemate situation that has formed in the legislative branch of Russia: while the forces of Communists and democrats are approximately equal at the Congress and in the Supreme Soviet, at the Supreme Soviet presidium Yeltsin and Silayev confront the pro-Communist Six. There have been suggestions that the Congress be dissolved and new elections held and there is a logic to this. However, Yeltsin spoke up against this idea. If the Congress is dissolved, until the new elections, Russia will be parliamentless – the ideal situation in which to introduce direct presidential rule. New elections parallel with the still working old Congress is not the happiest way out either: as in any transition period, this situation may be fraught with instability.

One more lesson of the Congress. The Communists have had a chance to hear a chorus of voices in support of Yeltsin, a chorus coming from the very depth of the electorate. The mechanism of devoted love for one's political leader, so well known to us, is working at its highest already. In my opinion the Congress showed that Yeltsin's popularity has reached the highest of heights. From now on, there is practically nothing that could seriously affect his rating.

Yeltsin is now out of the reach of his opponents, but Yeltsin needs this Congress too: it is too dangerous to dissolve the Congress in the absense of a presidency in Russia. For a while, Yeltsin and the Congress will have to work together, so will deputies of different political affiliations. This is the reality which Russian MPs and the Kremlin will have to reckon with if they really don't want bloodshed and popular unrest.

Light in the end of the tunnel

The congress' main result: we have seen that neither side's absolute victory makes sense

Lilia Shevtsova

The political confrontation in Soviet society has not only lingered for too long, but, as the events of March 28 showed, may assume dramatic forms. The situation is aggravated by society's entering the period of social cataclysms. The miners' strikes are at least an organized form of protest. What will happen if wild crowds take to the streets?

Naturally, one question is of equal interest to all: which side will win? Most people are pessimistic and agree that the decisive battle has already been fought – and ended not in the democrats' favour.

It seemed that society started developing according to the scenario written in the right-wing camp. The Congress of People's Deputies of Russia had been planned as the logical conclusion of the counter-reformist drive. The hard-liners' strategy was to neutralize the democratic wing in the leadership of Russia and reduce that leadership to its former role of an obedient appendage to the Kremlin.

Long live the king?

Something hitched in the hitherto smoothly played political game. The developments at and around the congress have demonstrated that it is still too early to speak about the hard-liners' final victory and the onslaught of dictatorship, whichever names might be associated with it. Anyway, despite unprecedented unity and aggressiveness the hard liners have not won the congress. They have not been able to attract the votes of the oscilating centrists, the votes which are of crucial importance in the context when the democratic and the communist factions at the congress enjoyed an approximately equal influence. The stand of some deputies must have been heavily affected by the situation outside the Kremlin, the wave of strikes sweeping the country. For some deputies to openly associate themselves with the hard-liners meant to touch off a revolt among their electorate. The people's reaction to the anti-Yeltsin utterings by Goryacheva and Isakov is a convincing example.

Does this mean that the winners were the democrats?

The democrats have not been able to upset the parity in their favour. This is attested to by the discussion and voting connected with the introduction of presidency in Russia. Russia's own presidency was the main bone of contention over which the political forces divided.

Too long political debates and half-decisions can hardly satisfy the weary electorate who had expected the congress if not to solve all problems, but at least to become a watershed. One can easily visualize the frustration of the miners who regarded the congress as their last hope. Does this mean that this has been a congress with no winners or losers, a congress after which there is nothing left but a huge question mark? It might sound illogic, but this congress which has satisfied no party has played its role, and a big role at that. In his speech at the congress Boris Yeltsin pronounced a fair diagnosis of the current crisis. He also suggested a way out of the crisis. The Yeltsin strategy can be criticized or amended. But it is a strategy, not the already familiar verbal exercises. Still, this is not the congress' main lesson. The main thing is that the congress revealed the balance of forces in society, at least in Russia, defined these forces' social bases and objectives. The congress has ruined the last hopes that the hard-liners – and their recognized leader, the Communist Party of Russia – might too have an original anti-crisis programme. It has finally become obvious that the hard-liners have nothing to offer. What we have seen at the congress arouses pity, if not produces a shock.



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Facing society

What does the analysis of the balance of forces show? First, neither of the opposing camps is a monolyth. Each camp has its own internal differences and disagreements. The balance of political forces has not yet been finally shaped. Even the hard-liners did not seem perfectly consolidated and their faction at the congress, called Kommunisty Rossii, has shown the signs of a possible schism. Second, it is obvious now that neither side can solve the crisis independently. This is the main reason why the congress has not seen the final triumph of either camp.

Where is the way out? The only way out is compromise, coalition, alliance, if only temporary. This is one of the main conclusions provided by the congress of people's deputies of the Russian Republic. The current confrontation is a no-win game. The sides have to negotiate. A solution by force cannot be ruled out, of course, although it is not clear what the proponents of such a solution can hope for. They should consider the option of being left face to face with a weary and restive society... Nonetheless, there is an impression that in both camps certain forces have a stake in a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Will these forces take the upper hand. Will right- and left-wingers and moderates be able to meet at the bargaining table?

One last remark. We have just seen an emotional and dramatic political spectacle. The developments at the congress demonstrated that to hope for an absolute victory is both dangerous and stupid. The congress was the first opportunity for us to see that the way out of the crisis is dialogue, not confrontation of the opposing political forces.

At the same time, the congress showed that such wild and noisy gatherings are absolutely unacceptable as a form of administration. This means that a new structure of power has to be formed as soon as possible.

A chance for a civic concord

Lev Bezymensky

Sometimes we are witnessing miraculous changes. In the past, for example, we often criticized Boris Yeltsin for the vagueness, if not certain irreality of his proposals. On the other hand, the Union government was known for the down-to-earth and routine nature of its ideas. Now we have the prime minister who is bent on striking people with his fertile imagination. Thus, he has astonished the world with the story about the conspiracy of world banks against the Soviet currency. And quite recently I was really moved when during his appearance on TV, without batting an eyelid, he was trying to convince everyone that it was impossible to put your money in a Western bank without submitting the proof of its origin. And what has happened to the visionary Yeltsin? In his report to the Congress he has made more concrete proposals in all spheres of political, social and economic life than you can shake a stick at. Evidently, it will take us quite some time to examine them and make up our mind about their merits. I, for one, would like to take up only one idea – the idea of the "round table" as a form of public dialogue.

The idea of the "round table" is attractive – but who is going to sit at it?

What is the unquestionable merit of this idea? Its merit is that it provides a practical instrument for the attainment of a civic concord that is so badly needed in our turbulent times. It calls for a fair comparison of views and the search for a compromise in the interests of the entire society and not only of a certain group. It rules out the subordination of one force to another and requires tolerance and patience. For example, at that table the Communist Party should not call in advance all dissidents the "members of the opposition," and Boris Yeltsin, for that matter, should get rid of his habit of ascribing all the sins to the CPSU.

Another aspect: by existing alongside the usual constitutional patterns, the "round table" can perform the role of a body essential for "checking" and correcting the actions of governments and parliaments against the mood of the broad masses. That such a checking is badly needed has been demonstrated by the March 28 events in Moscow when the authorities have displayed a surprising inability to understand the mood of the people. If Yeltsin's opponents thought that 50,000 policemen and soldiers would provide an argument against the Russian Federation's leader, they have only achieved the opposite result. Such miscalculations can be dangerous.

The idea of the "round table" creates some doubts too. Is it not going to create a legalized diarchy? With the paralysis of power that is existing today, is it not going to bereave the government of its remaining levers for putting things right in the untuned mechanism of the Soviet state? The experience of East European countries in this respect is not always gratifying. In some of them "round tables" have practically replaced the governments, in others they have become a brake in their work while still in other they have prepared their own downfall (as it happened in the GDR). But there has been positive experience too, when this method helped to ensure an orderly transition from absolutism to the embryos of democracy.

But here is the pivotal question to which, in my view, there is no clear answer: who should participate in that "round table"? It would be a different matter if the USSR had a developed multiparty system the representative character of which would not be called into question. But this is not the case even when one speaks about the CPSU, for within its general framework there exist different and sometimes mutually exclusive forces: there is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation together with the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU, and there is also the Communist Party of Georgia or the remains of the Democratic Platform. Who among them should take the seat that, undoubtedly, belongs to such an influential and powerful force?

It is not easy to answer that question when one begins to think about the newly-formed parties. I wouldn't like to hurt the feelings of their leaders and adherents, but I am just not sure that those parties (at least many of them) really exist. The Democratic Russia movement is just being taking shape. One could have the first-hand look at the confusion in the ranks of democrats during the February 24 rally in Moscow when right after the statement by the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia the next speaker solemnly proclaimed the creation of the People's Party of Russia. But every cloud has a silver lining. The idea of the "round table" will provide a stimulus for the development of the new social patterns.

There are certain difficulties as to who will constitute the "ground" on which the legs of the table should be placed. Yeltsin spoke of **"all political forces and professional associations of all the republics."** This formular is not clear. Does it apply only to the Russian Federation or to the entire Soviet Union? Does it mean that in the latter case we shall have to invite the Ukrainian Rukh and the Latvian Popular Front and Interfront? And what about the strikers' committees in Kuzbass and our traditional associations – the Committees of Women, the Peace Committees and the Committees of Veterans, as well as creative unions? There is much to be discussed yet.

The conclusion: the fruitful idea should be subjected to a careful analysis and evaluation and compared to alternative projects. And since it was the leader of the Russian Federation's parliament (we don't know yet what will be the reaction of the parliament itself) who made this proposal, there appears to be a real opportunity **to implement into practice the idea of the "round table" within the Russian Federation.** Here in a kind of a miniature (the word is not quite proper for the gigantic federation) exist almost all of the Soviet Union's conflicts – social, national and spiritual. Here exist developed social movements. Here, at last, exists a young and daring government that, I hope, will not experience a panic terror in connection with the appearance of a new, unknown, if not risky partner.

If the CPSU is serious about its giving up the Article 6 of the Constitution and is looking for its quite legitimate and necessary place in the transformed society, it should try to get used to alternative thinking resulting in the adoption of non-standard decisions among which is the creation of the "round table." For it was precisely this quality that has made it possible for Mikhail Gorbachev to set in motion both the Soviet society and the Party. It was just some time ago that the President publicly declared that there was no way back, and the calls to return back were a mistake and a delusion. Consequently, one should look for the means to ensure the march forward. The "round table" is one of such means.

Sharing power

"Save the country!" says the President, the Premier, parliamentarians, TV anchormen. Save from whom? The democrats? The Communists? Too active voters? Or the President?

Galina Sidorova,
NT political analyst

The government tried to ignore the current miners' strike. But eventually agreed to negotiate
Photo by Yuri Gripas

Shortly before and during the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation hysterical calls could be heard from everywhere: "The country is on the verge of collapse!" In a sense, both opposing sides benefit from the avalanche of fears and tales of horror. The still ruling Communists many of whose decisions have proved unpopular and ineffective exploit the fears in order to back up their power, or at least the belief that they are still in power, with the strength of the army and secret police. The democratic leaders use the public fear to gain more foothold by emphasizing the unpopular decisions and their possible consequences to the voters. The powerful Communists were especially active in the current fomenting of fears.

What about the common people? They are tired. In this atmosphere, one starts wondering: perhaps it's time to stop saving the country and let its citizens rely on themselves, their own skills and smartness in the troubled time of the switchover to a free market?

The impression is that this country's leaders who in 1985 took the first tentative steps in the dark in order to provide the Soviets with civilized living conditions, continue to wander with their eyes blindfolded. One only has to tear the blindfold away to see the right road, the road of all Western, or as they are also called, civilized nations.

And yet if one is to continue saving the country? In this case, all rescue programmes and policies should be based on reality: the socialist gains in the form of endless queues and filthy beerhouses are all what we have now, and we still have not seen what a better future may be like. All things new we see today at least in our economy, are basically the hastily refurbished and patched-up relics of the past.

The rescue work could be more effective if the President and his entourage stopped their regular ideological incantations about the socialist choice and sterile debates about communism and anti-communism. If some people cannot live without an ideology, let us all adopt one ideology: comprehensive development of and respect for human rights – the right to own property, to freedom of speech, assembly and conscience, the right to information, the right to freely choose one's place of residence and to free travel in and out of the country, the right to rudimentary social guarantees and protection by the state and the right to shape up one's own life.

For me the salvation of the country starts with the authorities' respect for the individual, with the individual's

freedom from endless instructions and directives imposed from above, the recognition of the individual's right to a personal opinion and choice, the right to support any ideas one likes more. This right is denied to Soviets – otherwise there can be no explanation to the fact that on the eve of the March 17 referendum an announcer for the official TV Channel One kept instructing the viewers how to fill out the ballots, where to drop them and what answers to give to the referendum questions.

One part of the destructive legacy we have inherited from the past is the still natural hyerarchy in society based on the division between the leaders and the masses. This principle is the ultimate expression of the leaders' arrogance and condescention, attempts to curry favor with and mistrust of the masses, and the never ending fear for their future.

An American politician addresses his or her programme to individual voters. Hence the tradition to press flesh during the election marathon: the more hands you shake the greater are the chances for success. For Soviet leaders people are nothing but a mass. Either the popular mass, or the party mass. The concept of mass is humiliating for human dignity. It is a concept which the leaders use and abuse however they like. Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites who gather for a meeting at which to express their opinion are indiscriminately called a mob threatening the personal security of 29 People's Deputies who have complained of "psychological pressure." Immediately, the authorities imposed a virtual martial law in the city. "The people will not understand us, we will not allow betrayal of working people's interest," these are the arguments employed to oppose the "unviable" programme of giving land into private possession of peasants. At the same time, instead of meeting with the destitute miners and starting a dialogue with them, the President sits at the CPSU Conference of the Soviet Armed Forces listening to the reports "on the current moment and measures for consolidation and organizational and political strengthening of the CPSU organizations in the Armed Forces of the USSR!"

The latest meeting impressed me by the calm confidence, displayed by the demonstrators. They were not an uncontrollable mob, they were a body of like-minded people.

The salvation of this country is in the understanding that honour and dignity of the elected representatives of the people cannot be protected and promoted by the suppression of honour and dignity of the voters.

Demonstrators take to the streets carrying slogans "Gorbachev resign!" So what? In any civilized country such calls addresed to presidents and governments can often be heard in the streets and at parliaments and nobody seems to be shocked by them. Dissidence is the natural state of a democratic society and it does not at all mean mutual destruction.

Shall we return to concord? We have already lived in concord, or to be more precise, in the illusion of concord. We know what price had to be paid for that concord. Communist ideology does not forgive dissidence. The most horrible thing, however, is that even in death the system metastasizes: intolerance permeats post-socialist society as well. This is easily seen in Eastern Europe.

Recently I met my good friends living in Prague. Both of them are professional and highly experienced diplomats and have worked for years at Czechoslovak embassies in various countries. They have been fired, both of them, for having worked for the communist regime, and will be replaced by amateurs whose main advantage is loyalty to the new rulers.

Will we be able to avoid the uncivilized excesses of new democracy, East European style? I do not want my friends in Moscow, brilliant professional all of them, find themselves fired one day because they had not turned in their CP cards in time. But the more the Party leaders enrage the people by arrogant shows of military muscle, the more they try to gag the opponents, the more possible it becomes that the opposition which will eventually take over the Kremlin sooner or later will not be more tolerant and forgiving to its former enemies that the East European regimes. Society does not have enough political culture to be tolerant. This culture, in my opinion, can still be cultivated if we start doing it now, during the transition period. It would be only logical to expect the de facto ruling CPSU and its general secretary alias president to make the first step to cooperation. Will they have enough political courage to share power, to enter a coalition government composed of representatives of various political parties and movements and depoliticize state structures? Will the opposition be wise and tolerant enough for a dialogue? Normal life of society and the people will vastly depend on whether various political forces will be able to create a mechanism of coexistence and constructive cooperation.

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A new victory for bureaucracy

To raise prices does not mean to change over to a free-market economy. The plants will earn more and produce less

Anatoly Matlin,
D.Sc.(Economics)

The only thing that all the members of our society have in common today is their discontent with the state of affairs in our economy. People are divided, however, on where the causes of the current crisis lie, and, consequently, come to different conclusions.

The "streamlining of prices" has begun in the country. After the exchange of banknotes, this is the government's second major step taken as part of the economic reform. We are told that the price rise is the starter which will set the mechanism of the free-market model going. Aren't we being deluded?

Bankruptcy cannot happen here

The adherents of the totalitarian or authoritarian economy would rather keep the present economic order basically intact. Specifically, they are out to preserve at any cost the economic conditions necessary for the functioning of state-run enterprises irrespective of whether society wants them or not, whether they are efficient and technologically advanced.

Hence periodical rises in wholesale and purchasing prices following the appearance of enterprises working at a 10-15 percent loss in this or that industry. Such enterprises appear regularly, once in every six years, in accordance with the six-year fixed capital renewal cycle common in the industrialized world. Unprofitableness manifests itself in the growth of debt. As of the beginning of 1990, overdue indebtedness (a unique invention of the totalitarian economic system) of enterprises and organizations to banks and to one another amounted to 21.9 billion rubles. According to normal economic laws this debt should long have been exacted from the debtors who, under the circumstances, would have gone bankrupt.

In the Soviet economy bankruptcy is out of the question: all the property is state-owned, and there is no one to sell the bankrupt enterprises' assets to. This inevitably leads to irresponsibility with the ensuing self-severance of all economic links and change-over to natural exchange (barter deals). Unprofitableness can be concealed by raising wholesale and purchasing prices, but this measure will take effect for only a short while.

In the final analysis, the rise in wholesale and purchasing prices affects retail prices – sooner or later there arises the need for raising them. The rise in wholesale and purchasing prices is nothing but inflation which emerges in an economy where most payments are made by written order. Gradually, inflation infiltrates cash turnover and results in commodity shortages. This process is backed by the state economic policy which pumps all the labour, material and cash resources into inflated industrial construction and into the maintenance of the military-industrial complex.

The adherents of the authoritarian economy are of the opinion that by raising retail prices and filling the stores with goods people cannot afford they will create incentives for hard work. What this actually amounts to is another test of our peoples' extraordinary patience. Its likely results are more or less obvious: social outbursts, strikes, and, at the "quietest," a general "sitdown strike" lasting for decades.

The present government's pricing policy was defined by the USSR Council of Ministers in its resolution No. 741 of June 14, 1988, entitled "On a Revision of Wholesale Prices and Tariffs in Industry and in Other Branches of the National Economy." Tabled by the State Committee for Prices, of which Valentin Pavlov was then the chief, the resolution was signed by Nikolai Ryzhkov.

Two Pavlov ideas

There were two "big ideas" behind this resolution on the basis of which wholesale prices and industrial tariff rates, in effect since early this year, were set.

The first idea was to bring the prices closer to the socially necessary expenses which are interpreted not as one's expenses on reproducing his work capacity but as "state expenses involved in the reproduction of labour (?) and natural resources, subsidised from the budget and other sources." For that purpose, various indirect taxes were "built into" new wholesale prices and raised considerably.

Indirect taxes are levied on goods and services and are not immediately linked up with the taxpayers' incomes and property status. They are included in product prices or in service charges, while the enterprise owner pays the tax into the budget at the expense of the receipts from the sales of these products and services – in other words, the enterprise acts as a tax collector. All this is paid for by the consumer who purchases goods at higher prices. The most recent example, understandable to all, is the five-percent "President's tax." Incidentally, Lenin regarded indirect taxes as

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

"a great injustice." "The poorer a man," he wrote, "the greater proportion of his earnings goes to the state in indirect tax."

In new wholesale prices, indirect taxes are now as follows: income tax exacted from waged and salaried workers (13 percent so far); insurance premiums (37 percent of wage, a 2.4-fold increase by the government decision); deductions which go into subsidizing geological prospecting work, water supply bills (no less than 10 percent of the wage). If we add to this that the average enterprise profit rate, calculated in new wholesale prices, is at least 150 percent of the wage fund, we shall get the true picture of "real cost" or "socially necessary expenditures" "à la Pavlov."

Just in terms of wholesale prices and tariff rates (with the turnover tax not taken into account) the surplus value exacted by the state and by enterprises from the income brought in by factory and office workers will amount to no less than 210 percent of their wages and salaries! This means that we, the working people, take home less than a third of what we earn. This kind of super-exploitation has had no precedents in the recorded history of mankind.

The second idea is to charge the use of natural resources by inflating their prices accordingly. This is not a new idea, as a matter of fact. It has already been used by the Ministry of Finance: it is more convenient, simpler, and more reliable to make a profit on mining raw materials than on processing them. The only innovation is the reference made to the level and proportions of world prices. This reference, however, is made only for show: oil has never been sold at domestic market prices, and as to the level of world prices, first, we ought to adapt to them the prices we pay in our home market for tights and TV sets.

A major rise in wholesale raw material prices makes it unprofitable to process raw materials. For instance, the planned increase of wholesale crude oil prices by 2.3 times will triple oilmen's earnings but reduce the oil refining industry workers' pay to a third. A steady rise in the expenditures involved in all the stages of raw materials processing tells on consumer goods production in the end. Consumer goods manufacturing is becoming a steadily less lucrative occupation.

The rise in the wholesale prices charged for the goods supplied to agriculture also sends purchasing prices up. This, in turn, detracts from the profitability of the light and food industries.

In the final analysis, the rise in wholesale and purchasing prices affects the level of the retail prices now in effect. Considering the 200-percent rate of surplus value built into wholesale prices, it would be only logically for retail prices to jump.

Cunning "subsidies"

If retail prices remain higher than wholesale or purchasing ones, the price differential results in trade profit and in a turnover tax which goes to the budget revenues. If wholesale or purchasing prices are higher than retail ones, the difference should be compensated somehow.

In economic literature this difference in prices is termed "subsidy," although the state budget has offered no subsidies until early this year. The State Bank of the USSR paid for farm produce purchases in cash and by written orders without any restrictions, recording the price differential on a special account. The Ministry of Finance did not make up for this differential with the result that its debt to the State Bank grew to reach 490 billion rubles by August, 1990.

It follows from the above that farm produce price differential was actually compensated not by budget subsidies, but by **extra paper money emission.** This largely explains the inflation which has emerged in the country and led to our present commodity shortages. Agriculture received enormous sums in paper money not covered by commodity resources. The state paid annual "subsidies" instead of investing money in the modernization of the food industry which would help reduce the colossal losses in farm produce.

At the beginning of 1991, the national Finance Ministry got rid of this "subsidy" by transferring the function of compensating price differential to republican and local budgets. As distinct from the national Ministry, the republican and local authorities cannot transfer their functions to the State Bank and are compelled, therefore, to pay up from their meagre profits.

Having failed to ascertain the causes of wholesale and purchasing price rises (a problem created by the central government), the Republics have resigned to the pressure for a retail price increase, regarding it as an inevitability.

Should we pin any hopes on new prices?

Unfortunately, those who insist on a changeover to the free-market economy have found themselves in the same position. The "marketeers" naively presume that by "liberalizing" prices or "setting them free" they can put an end to the disbalance between supply and demand in the consumer and capital goods market and stem the growth of wasted expenses in the national economy.

Actually, the "programme" of changing over to free market by means of a pricing reform will bring the same monopoly prices – only much higher ones. As prices keep growing, production will slump steadily, and goods will be in ever shorter supply.

The thing is that there is a fundamental difference in the economic roles prices have to play in the monopolized totalitarian economy, on the one hand, and in a normal market economy, on the other. In fact, what "we" and "them" call "prices" are entirely different things which have only the name, "price," in common. In our case, any price rise reduces consumer demand – but not the state-owned enterprises' demand for capital goods. The enterprises simply include extra expenditures in the price of their products. By earning more as a result, they can produce less still.

In our economy as it is today, a rise in prices cannot ensure production growth in principle. Theoretical considerations and the practical record of our country and other countries trying to change over from state monopoly to a market economy under the leadership of Communist, semi-Communist or non-Communist governments show that such attempts are doomed to failure. The problem actually lies in the investment policy.

In a free market economy, a price rise caused by consumer demand leads to greater investments in the production and marketing of the goods in high demand. The more people buy, the more a normal economy produces. In our economy, this vital mechanism will never work. The state exacts from the producer all his financial resources which are then redistributed not as dictated by the market, but at civil servants' discretion.

Prices are always set by the owner of goods, our state keeps its property and endorses new prices. Whether these prices are called adjustable or free makes no difference. These are state prices in any case, whether they are set by the central government or by its representatives in the provinces. Monopoly state prices inevitably lead to total economic irresponsibility, technological stagnation and stronger bureaucracy. The new price rise is another victory for bureaucracy over the interests of the producer and the consumer, another confirmation of the fact that all the attempts made by private individuals and enterprises to work honestly and efficiently are in vain.

The current price situation leaves us no hopes for things changing for the better. Production slump cannot be stopped that way, and goods will appear on the market only when no one can afford them. ■

POLEMICS

A la guerre comme à la guerre, of course, but what about post-war situations? What role is the army to play after the Cold War?

Marshal of the Soviet Union **Sergei Akhromeyev** has been our guest, interviewee and opponent recently. The talk centred on certain articles *New Times* had carried of late. The interviewers were Alexander Pumpyansky, Editor-in-Chief of *New Times,* Evgeny Rusakov, an observer, and Sergei Rogov, D.Sc.(History).

A. Pumpyansky. Welcome to the *New Times* grounds, Sergei Fyodorovich. When you suggested a face-to-face discussion, I replied that my colleagues and I would consider it a privilege. That was not a tongue-in-cheek remark. Your suggestion came as a surprise because ordinarily people respond to our criticism by complaining to the authorities and demanding that the journalists be called to order...

S.Akhromeyev. Well, I must say that I, too, shared my discontent with one of your articles (Issue No.2, 1991) with the President himself. I simply had to do that because several military district commanders had telephoned me to voice their protests.

A.P. I have started this discussion in a rather unfortunate way, I'm afraid. Nevertheless, I shall permit myself another preliminary remark. When we enter into polemics, it is not for the purpose of cornering someone we consider "alien" or protecting someone we consider "friendly." In this particular case our objective is to find out, and to submit to our readers, your views on the key issues of security and on the relationships between the army and society.

And now, down to business. It seems to me that the most important question today is whether the external threat to the Soviet Union still exists. If yes, where does such a threat emanate from? What are the scale, character and targets of the threat? All the other questions and answers, including those which concern military buildup, are derivative.

S.A. Indeed, this is the cardinal question. Our foreign policy and, to a no small extent, the home situation in the Soviet Union largely depend on the answer to this question.

Military threat to the Soviet Union does exist today. It emanates chiefly from the United States and NATO. This danger, however, is different today, not what it used to be. Some three or four years ago that was an immediate war danger. There is no such danger today. Military threat and tension have diminished markedly. International relations are coming back to normal. Nevertheless, the United States' policy towards the Soviet Union is rather controversial. While seeking to reach understanding and even to cooperate with the Soviet Union the US is trying, at the same time, to bring pressure on us by various means, armed force included. This is where the danger lies. Let me illustrate.

First. The military setup of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is no more. The military setup of NATO remains. They say that NATO has been kept as a means of protecting Western democracy from the Soviet military threat. I do not take these assertions seriously. No one threatens NATO in Europe today.

In April, 1990, President Bush submitted to Congress the official document entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States." Congress took the document into consideration, i.e., virtually endorsed it. Over nearly a year since then, there has been no word of the document losing its validity. Here is what President Bush said in it: "Whatever course the Soviets take over the next decade, the Soviet Union will remain a formidable military power. The US must continue maintain modern defences that strengthen deterrences and enhance security." This is a perfectly clear definition of the United States' attitude to the Soviet Union today. That was followed by Paris, of course, where the Americans and ourselves signed three important treaties and formally announced that the two countries no longer regarded each other as hostile – but the "US National Security Strategy" remains in force.

Second. We are negotiating with the US a reduction of all arms except naval. The only reason for that is that the US naval forces are superior to ours many times over, and the Americans have no intention of cutting them.

Reasonable sufficiency?

Third. Upon encircling the Soviet Union with its army and naval bases forty years ago, the US still keeps those bases – 1,500 of them manned with a total of 500,000 troops. None of our American negotiating partners can explain to us the idea of maintaining those bases today. However, the answer is clear enough. The idea is to bring military pressure on the Soviet Union.

Fourth. There exist the state interests of the USSR which do not coincide with the interests of other countries. Take the Kuril Islands issue, for instance. The United States formally support Japan in its claims to the southern Kurils. Finally, there is the issue of the Baltics. Does the US stand on the matter of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia having acceded to the Soviet Union in 1940 correspond to the interests of the Soviet Union? The interests of the USSR and the USA by no means coincide all along the line. We ought to be frank about it. The Americans make no secret of the fact. Consequently, we should keep armed forces strong enough to enable our state to uphold the national interests of the Soviet Union, to prevent interference in our internal affairs.

A.P. I think we ought to be quite clear on this point.

If an army has concentrated on our border with the obvious intention of capturing our territory and enslaving our people, it's one thing. Does such an immediate military threat exist? If it does, then we must play our cards right and do good mental arithmetics. If we have someone like Alexander the Great on our border, then we've got to have a hundred combat elephants. The latter can be substituted by a a hundred whales – provided, of course, that we have found the answer to the question plagueing us since childhood: who is stronger, the elephant or the whale? If we are threatened by Bonapart with his continental army, we also have to call up 600,000 men. Such, roughly, is the traditional logic of our military propaganda as it projects the magnitude of a threat facing us. This is a 1812 or a 1941 syndrome, if you will. The entire Cold War epos hinged on it. The people were told that the American imperialists, West German revenge seekers, Japanese militarists, NATO and the West were their worst enemies. Those sinister forces poised over our heads, all set to invade our country and to deliver a nuclear strike. If this is really the case,

On nuclear weapons, Vietnams and Afghanistans

then our behaviour is logical. Everything for the army! Let us tighten our belts, gear our economy to war needs at any cost, make any sacrifices, but not let the worst come to the worst.

But is the situation really as bad as that today? What you have said suggests a different picture. The very fact that the Americans possess a high military potential is a threat in intself. But isn't this an entirely different situation from which entirely different conclusions should be derived? Let us see whether your definition of a threat has undergone any changes, and whether the traditional ideological and political guidelines on that score, current in the fifties, the sixties and the seventies, have been correct.

S.A. The Soviet Union has been conducting a new foreign policy formulated in 1986 for five years. Our foreign policy is responsible for all the radical changes which have occurred in Europe. When we got down to implementing it we presumed that changes in Central Europe and the unification of Germany would take place. All that did not happen overnight. In a state like ours, foreign policy is not planned for one year, or even several years ahead. Therefore, we expected this foreign policy and the accompanying changes to reduce the war threat considerably, if not to eliminate it altogether. We worked for that. Did our Western partners meet us halfway? Yes, they did. After a long period of indecision, the United States finally made up its mind to reach understanding and agreement with us. The West European countries have also been cooperative, maybe even to a greater extent. Therefore we are now speaking about war danger, not military threat.

War danger and tension have decreased – even deformed, I should say. Is there the immediate danger of a war being unleashed today? Would it be right to say that NATO armies, ready to take immediate aggressive action, have been concentrated on our borders? No, it wouldn't. The Soviet Union faces no such immediate war threat now. Neither do other European countries. This is what the Soviet Union and the West can show for their joint efforts. Nevertheless, military pressure is still being brought on us, I repeat. There are the Soviet Union's state interests and the Soviet Union's socialist choice to be protected. And there are forces, external forces, which want the Soviet Union to pursue a policy suitable for them but not always serving our interests. Let me be perfectly frank about that: such forces are at work in the United States and in other countries. If we are to conduct an independent foreign policy, we have to keep the armed forces sufficient for the purpose. Not only that alone, of course. We also need a highly developed economy, and we must secure the people's support for that policy. Everything should be well balanced.

A.P. The Soviet Union's new foreign policy is a crucial factor, no doubt. However, much as we should like to compliment our country, our foreign policy our leadership ought to be more modest about our achievements. We say that perestroika is a return to common sense. No sooner had we regained common sense than the West responded to that. Had common sense come back to us earlier, the West would have responded to that accordingly. Well, this is just a passing remark. The assessment of military threat has changed fundamentally, and this is the most important thing.

Previously we believed – whether with reason or not – in the immediate danger of invasion. This is no longer the case. Our military theoreticians have drawn no conclusions from that revolution in our minds which should have caused fundamental change in our military concept. A different threat obviously calls for different means of neutralizing it. The principle of reasonable sufficiency is only natural in this case, and we have accepted it at the political level. Judging by their vigorous protests over the scrapping of even an extra thousand of obsolescent tanks, our military have hardly resigned to this principle.

"A la guerre comme à la guerre." What about post-war situations? After the

Cold War it would be only natural for the countries involved to demilitarize their economies. Instead, they panicked over the prospect of "disarming themselves"..

S.Rogov. What can be of military danger to a "nuclear superpower" like the Soviet Union? For as long as nuclear weapons exist, and for as long as the United States is capable of destroying the Soviet Union in thirty minutes – and vice versa – war danger will persist.

We should take into consideration not only what our potential enemies can do but also what they intend to do. Today both the Americans and ourselves say that neither side intends to unleash a thermonuclear war. From this standpoint your words to the effect that NATO and the USA are a threat to the Soviet Union are comparable with what Bush has said as applied to the United States. His message to Congress, however, contains a number of entirely new provisions, previously unheard-of in American politics, which are consonant with new political thinking. For instance, it says that the role of military force is diminishing, that it is necessary to promote cooperation with the Soviet Union, to change over from confrontation to partnership. No American President has ever used a language like that over the past forty years.



A.P. I must confess that the "scary" quotation from Bush has not scared me at all. I agree that under the present circumstances a certain potential of the other side provides grounds (or a justification) of our side to attain a similar potential. But whereas the notion of military threat amounts to the fact of existence on the other side, quite different conclusions follow from that. First of all, the two sides should make up their mind on what they would like to be to one another – enemies, opponents, partners, friends or, horribile dictum, allies in world affairs. If they satisfy themselves that none has any hostile intentions, then they should reduce their military components. Mutually so, and keep proving to one another that each is acting in good faith. There are no grounds altogether for threatening anyone or reviving up the war machine.

S.A. Dear comrades, there are three of you here versus the only me. You have asked so many questions at once that I have difficulty answering them. When I was speaking about war danger I realized, of course, that both sides have nuclear weapons which are a means of deterrence and also a permanent source of mortal danger to all mankind. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons today are neither a reliable guarantee against aggression, nor a safeguard of national interests. Although in the mid-seventies the US had about the same strategic nuclear potential as it has today, it suffered defeat in Vietnam. We met a defeat in Afghanistan, and no nuclear weapons could prevent it. I am discussing the purely military rather than the political or moral aspect of the matter. In certain situations nuclear weapons have proved useless. Conventional armed forces and conventional weapons have been used.

Today's world is such that besides nuclear weapons, which have become a political deterrent, states need conventional arms. Take the Persian Gulf, for instance. Iraq possessed an enormous war machine, which crushed Kuwait in no time. The aggression triggered the formation of an immeasurably greater war machine which routed Iraq.

The Soviet Union is in a complicated geostrategic situation. It needs force to protect its national interests. Those who say that such an armed force is unnecessary are either in error, or wish the country ill. What will happen if the Soviet Union becomes weak and incapable of defending itself? A great power cannot afford being weak militarily.

As to making up our minds on what we should like the other side to be to us – an enemy or an ally – this is a two-way process, you see. So far the US often acts from positions of strength. Arms reduction is also a two-way process.

A.P. I think you have cited very apt examples, Sergei Fyodorovich. While being a means of intimidation – or rather a deterrent ensuring a certain degree of security, nuclear weapons are not omnipotent; it is not for nothing that the Americans failed to win in Vietnam, and we failed to win in Afghanistan. Is that so?

S.A. It simply cannot be brought into play.

A.P. However, these examples suggest an entirely different conclusion. Nuclear weapons cannot serve any offensive, interventionist, occupationist or any other purposes – Vietnam and Afghanistan are cases in point. These examples have nothing to do with defence.

So what do we need the armed forces for – defence or some other purposes? Both examples are those of aggression, but you have cited them in the context of protecting state interests. The Americans, you implied, failed to further their state interests in Vietnam, and we failed to do that in Afghanistan. And that was all for the best, if you ask me. To my mind, it would have been in the US national interests not to get involved in Vietnam, and it was in the Soviet Union's national interests not to get involved in Afghanistan.

We are obliged to respect the legitimate interests of America. Not the interests which can be furthered by something like the Vietnam war, though. The world community condemned our behaviour in Afghanistan, and quite rightly so. In this sense, it understood our state interests better than our leaders did.

So it's worth discussing legitimate, universally recognized interests seen in their right perspective. This calls for the appropriate system of expressing and formulating them. In a broad sense, this

presupposes a democratic system inside the country, and in a narrow sense – an open procedure, parliamentary hearings...

If we proceed from such a democratic, civilized notion of state, national interests, the need for the armed forces will be qualitatively and quantitatively different than in the case of planning more Vietnams and Afghanistans.



On tanks which saved us from a nuclear war, and on tanks which we saved from disarmament

S.A. I have cited a third example, too: Iraq–Kuwait. Speakinjg of nuclear and conventional arms I have just answered your question about nuclear and conventional forces and the interrelationships between them.

After that you declared against an aggressive army and for a fair policy. I have no bones to pick with you on that issue. I repeat: any state needs conventional armed forces to defend itself against aggression and to protect its national interests. If you have any doubts about that, I consider such doubts ungrounded.

What are the Soviet Union's national interests today? Our relations with other countries are determined by our foreign policy and by a new military doctrine. Modern Soviet foreign policy boils down to the triad of demilitarization, democratization and deideologization. Demilitarization means non-use of armed force when you are not attacked, the use of force only as a means of repelling aggression. Democratization means that any country, small or big, is free to manage its own internal affairs, and no one has the right to encroach upon this freedom. Deideologization means that foreign policy is based on international law and nothing but international law.

Such were the points of departure of the new military doctrine of the Soviet Union. As we put this foreign policy into action we said that today we need only the kind of army the sole purpose of which would be to ensure a reliable defence of the country in the present-day situation. We are now restructuring our armed forces in acordance with this doctrine. No country but the Soviet Union has reduced its armed forces by 12 percent so far. No country but the Soviet Union has cut its defence spending by 18 percent.

Everything should be well balanced, of course. Our most important task now is to remedy the situation in our economy, to raise our people's standard of living. The reduction in the army's and the navy's numerical strength and the cutting of defence spending are all very fine. But we must do everything sensibly, without running to extremes.

A.P. In what is pressure being brought to bear on the Soviet Union, I'd like to know? Could you please give an example of that, for the sake of clarity? Have there been actual cases of the hostile military force bringing or trying to bring pressure on us and prevented from prevailing on us only by our adequate or superior might? Did we, or could we, yield to anyone as far as our state interests or even our ideological purity is concerned? Here is a rather typical motif of the letters we get: look at Albania or Cuba. Their ruling regimes have not budged an inch to anyone for decades, even if they were blunderingly wrong. No force in the world could prevail on those not too great powers. So who is going to bully us?

S.A. Our entire military doctrine and our foreign policy are certainly peaceful today and do not threaten anybody, but in pursuing them we have to take into consideration the US and NATO military might, the US military bases we are encircled with. We feel this might breathing down our neck all the time. War danger has diminished, indeed, but it is perfectly real, and it remains. We are building up our armed forces with the military might of the USA and NATO taken into account, of course.

As for specific examples of pressure, I have already cited them. What's the use of repeating myself?

Somehow, you persistently ignore naval forces. They are very much real. No one wants to negotiate their reduction with us, ostentatiously so. This has been going on for decades... Don't you think this is a form of military pressure?

A.P. They have, say, ten, twenty or thirty aircraft carriers. Have these aircraft carriers compelled us to sell the land to the peasants? Or to privatize the industry? Or prevented us from launching the ridiculous anti-drink campaign? What's the connection here?

S.A. As to the US strike aircraft carrying units, I must say that they are a weapon of great danger to the Soviet Union.

As regards the connection between the likely actions of these aircraft carriers and the proposed sale of land, factory privatization and the anti-drink campaign in the USSR, I see no such connection, probably for lack of imagination. Things are much simpler than that. The US aircraft carriers constitute a military force which, within six to eight days of receiving the "go-ahead," can reach the shores of the Soviet Union and pose a military threat to us.

And another thing. You keep talking about tanks, I think you are ill disposed towards tanks. Well, you shouldn't be. The tanks did not only bring us victory in the Great Patriotic War, they saved us from a nuclear war.

As to Cuba, I do not think I have any business discussing its policy. Cuba has been besieged by the US for thirty years. Isn't this common knowledge?

E. Rusakov. The problem of guaranteeing national security is not confined to the military sphere, it has many other aspects – economic, technological, home-policy,

diplomatic, even moral. Our society is now gravely concerned over a sensible combination of these aspects and over their conformity to the realistic potentialities of the country. Our growing economic and technological lag is becoming a factor undermining domestic stability, our capacity for making modern weapons, and so forth. On the other hand, the militarization of the economy has made and is still making its sizeable contribution to economic dislocation and to the pauperization of the people. Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union faces the choice of either pursuing its old course, or, while strengthening its defences within reasonable limits, concentrating on solving the fundamental social problems and on seeking political ways of guaranteeing security. Recall the invincible ancient Greek phalanx – would it have made any sense if the warriors' shields had been too heavy to carry?

On the leaders who did not trust the West

S.R. We are all for military-strategic parity, but the country is now in a situation where it is compelled to keep up an approximate equilibrium with America, Western Europe, Japan and China taken together. No state can possibly stand such a strain. All the more so since, according to statistics published two years ago, our superiority in most ground weapons and even in combat aircraft is considerable.

Now the USSR is forced to make much greater arms cut than the West does and to scrap combat equipment created by the efforts of our people at the cost of much sacrifice.

S.A. Concerning parity. Previously we did seek to be equally strong all along the line. By previously I mean the period of up to the year 1985. This tendency was abandoned in the 1987. We did not only announce the new doctrine formally, we are putting it into practice. In the field of strategic nuclear weapons we still seek to maintain approximate equilibrium between us and the United States. This is very important. *In the field of conventional weapons we set ourselves no such objective.* You mentioned thousands of tanks and other weapons being eliminated today. This is a big problem which is now often speculated about.

The tank problem should be examined from a historical angle. In 1945, after the war – and you know what the war did to us – the Soviet Union did not want confrontation. The United States emerged from the war with the atomic bomb. Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles conducted the policy of atomic blackmail and the arms race versus the Soviet Union then. The atomic threat was a real one. The Soviet Union had to find a way out of the predicament. It had no atomic weapons then yet. How could it answer the threat? How was the Soviet Union to prevent a nuclear aggression against it?

I have read contemporary documents on the subject. At that time, political leadership and the Army High Command repeatedly gathered in session, with Stalin in the chair, and finally arrived at the conclusion that the only course open to us was to form in Europe a powerful grouping of armed forces (tank units, mostly) which would threaten Europe. The idea was to have Western Europe keep the US from perpetrating a nuclear aggression against the USSR.

Colleagues, friends, or foes? Personal contacts and real doctrines produce different notions of the interrelationships between the two superpowers' military. Photo: Marshal Akhromeyev at an American army base

Later, NATO counterbalanced our conventional arms by its own, by which time we already had nuclear weapons. Such is the prehistory of the question, and I don't think that our political and military leaders of the past were as stupid as all that. Their judgement of the situation was no worse than ours.

Still later, in the sixties and the seventies, stopping or at least curbing the arms race became a realistic proposition. I happened to work at the General Staff for years. In the mid-seventies it was perfectly clear that conventional arms cuts could be negotiated in earnest and that military spending could be reduced unilaterally. In 1975, a balance of strategic nuclear forces set in. After we had developed MIRVs of our own, nuclear balance was achieved, and the US was no longer in a position to outstrip us in this sphere. The General Staff realized that full well. Chief of the General Staff Victor Kulikov drew up the appropriate proposals, but in 1975 our Defence Minister was Andrei Grechko. Under him, carrying out those proposals was out of the question. He died in 1976, and Dmitry Ustinov succeeded him as Minister of Defence. The scheme for a reduction of military spending was finalized and submitted to him. As bad luck would have it, Brezhnev fell critically ill then. Ustinov looked through the proposals submitted to him by Marshal Kulikov and said: "Where shall I take this to? Leonid Ilyich is ill." The whole thing ended at that. You should consider another thing, too. After a huge machine has been set in motion, with those in high places accustomed to pursuing a definite policy, such a machine is very difficult to stop. This requires a change of leadership, even a change of system in the first place.

S.R. You are saying that we have renounced the idea of parity as the maintenance of balance with all in conventional ground forces. How will you explain in this connection the transfer across the Urals of two thirds of the weapons which we had kept in Europe and which were subject to reduction? Just a quarter of them will be eliminated, another quarter used in rearmament, and a half put in storage. Why are we building up such an enormous reserve of conventional arms equal to the munitions industry's several annual outputs?

S.A. For quite a long time, many state and military leaders of the Soviet Union regarded their country as a predominantly European one. We somehow got ac-

customed to that. Most of the military threats we faced came from Europe, that was why we kept our best troops and our best weapons there. In the East we had quite a few divisions which, instead of armoured personnel carriers, and infantry combat vehicles, used civil trucks. As for other weapons, those divisions had them. We signed a treaty on the reduction of armed forces in Europe. This treaty does not ban arms transfers from the western part of the country across the Urals. Why should we eliminate new weapons and remain unarmed in the east? No one in his right mind would do that, I think. Look at NATO. It scraps old tanks in Turkey and sends new ones there instead. We also transfer new weapons from certain troop formations to the east (incidentally, some of the divisions withdrawn from the west have to be disbanded). These weapons include tanks, armoured personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles and artillery. We have put some of the weapons in storage so as to use them, in the next three or four years, as replacements for pieces of combat equipment which go out of order – we have cut the production of new weapons, you see, but battle training is going on. We have sent official word to the West about all this.

S.R. Sergei Fyodorovich, why hasn't this message been published in the Soviet Union? The West knows everything, but our public remains in the dark. This causes bewilderment.

S.A. I repeat, authentic statistics have been reported to the West. All these statistics appeared in an early January issue of *Moscow News*. Just pick up a copy, and you'll see.

What I have told you is no classified information. We have explained to our negotiating partners how many items of combat equipment is used for replenishment today, how many of them will be scrapped now, in the course of the year 1991, and what number of old weapons will be scrapped in army units and replaced by new ones within the next three or four years.

The stand taken by some of my opponents puzzles me at times. They demand, rather persistently, that I should give them specific information on what the Soviet Union is doing in strict conformity with the treaty. It turns out that they are concerned over the moral aspect of the question. However, they don't care whether the country's defence potential is maintained against the background of all the changes now going on, although this is the main thing. This is most indicative.

E.R. Our country has been in a unique position over the past few years. Since the times of Assyria, Ancient Rome, Charlemagne's and other ancient and early medieval empires, no great power has been acting in the world arena without strong allies. After Peter the Great had "cut a window on Europe," the Russian state has always had on its side one great power, at least. After the break with China, we found ourselves in proud isolation again – our partners in the Warsaw Treaty pact could hardly be regarded as strong allies. As a matter of fact, this question should have been addressed to our former leaders...

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

S.A. It was not always, unfortunately, that Russia had great-power allies. Recall the Crimean and the Russian-Turkish wars (of the 1850s-1870s), and as to the allies we've had being unreliable I do not agree with you, but this is a different matter. You have again raised the question I have touched upon in passing. I mean the question of the "leaders," of mistrust between the USSR and the West. Stalin was in control for nearly thirty years. His position was clear. That leader believed in force only both in human and interstate relations. His counterparts in Britain (Chamberlain) and France (Daladier) were much like him in this respect. Brezhnev and Khrushchev were different. Khrushchev, especially.

On the face of it, he was the man who had brought the "thaw" and was unseated for that. Nevertheless, he was also a product of his time. The leaders who went through the period of capitalist encirclement of the twenties and the thirties, and then through the Great Patriotic War, especially men like Khrushchev and Brezhnev who had already held important posts during the war, took a rigid stand on the matter of how our foreign policy should be conducted. They saw what was happening in 1941 and 1942 in our country when the Nazis murdered millions of people, brought a chaos of destruction in their wake. Khrushchev and Brezhnev were patriots, after all. Having witnessed all those horrors, they could not bring themselves to trusting the West to the end of their days. It was in their blood. This is my personal opinion, of course, but I think it is well grounded.

While at the General Staff, I often happened to read and analyze various materials, took part in conferences, saw various approaches to the solution of important problems. I met with Brezhnev on quite a few occasions. That man did not trust the West: "We shall survive," he said, "if we are strong." They say that the military brought pressure on Brezhnev. This is wrong. He did not have to be pressed. We did not have to convince him of anything. Brezhnev gave priority to military problems on his own initiative. That was what his life experience prompted him. Ustinov had also gone through the Great Patriotic War. Not at the fighting lines, though, but he had been to the front and to the rear and, as the People's Commissar for Armaments, knew what the situation there was. Therefore, those men's way of thinking took its final shape by the year 1945. The then young officers like myself – I emerged from the war a battalion commander – were not as opinionated. In the years that followed we proved able to reevaluate a lot of values. Older people could not do that. There is no getting away from the Great Patriotic War syndrome. You younger men will never understand how it feels.

Roosevelt sincerely wanted good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I think he meant it. Stalin trusted him, on the whole. How would things have worked out if Roosevelt had lived for another four years is anybody's guess. But those who succeeded him to office in the US were anti-Soviet. They did not trust us – any more than our own leaders trusted them.

A.P. Thank you, Sergei Fyodorovich. Your excursus into history and psychology has been most interesting and, indeed, instructive. To sum up: there is no war threat, but there is a military danger; pressure is being brought upon us; our internal affairs are being meddled in; and finally, we have interests and ideas which have to be protected. Such is the army's reasoning in a nutshell. Having heard out all the arguments, our reader will now be able to sit back, relax and ask himself whether they have convinced him that we really should maintain the world's biggest army, the world's most militarized economy which has proved unable to feed, clothe and shoe the people.

S.A. The reader will have to think a bit in order to ascertain the truth. As to your résumé, my conclusion is that we have ended right where we have started. We've failed to convince one another.

A.P. Be that as it may, let us now proceed to the second big subject of our discussion...

This subject is **The army and home policy.** (See *New Times*. No. 15).

How to get out of communism smarter

This is a question asked not only in Belgrade

After Communists were defeated at the elections across Eastern Europe, the question to be answered was what was going to replace the old regimes? Moreover as the opposition came to power exploiting public indignation, and when they came to the polls, people voted against Communists rather than for any other political party. In addition, opposition parties and movements were, as a rule, very new, their political images were still unclear and their programmes lacked substance.

Events in Yugoslavia developed according to a similar scenario. However, the situation in that country was different because of Yugoslavia's being a multinational state. The ethnic question became the battleground for Communists and the opposition. Each side claimed to be the only true defender of national interests. This specific feature of Yugoslavia's political life becomes especially visible when one considers the political spectrum that has formed in the country. One flank is occupied by Socialists or Communists advocating national slogans, the other includes purely nationalist parties exploiting a whole range of anti-Communist ideas in order to make their programmes different from what Communists have to offer.

In these conditions the political centre is hard to define. The most prominent force in the centre is the Union of Reformist Forces set up by premier Markovic. The premier's political creed runs as follows: the change of political parties in power must not influence the country's economic performance while the influence of political forces must be derived not from nationalist slogans but from the quality of their economic programmes.

The URF was not very successful at the republican elections, although its programme might have been the most optimistically-worded answer to the country's economic problems. Why did this happen? Explains Prof. **Ivan Dzuric** of the Belgrade University, 44, who was the reformists' candidate at the republican elections. His contenders were the Socialist Milosevic and the nationalist Draskovic. Dzuric came in last in the elections.

– The current political division in society suggests that society is still lacking in democracy. Two visions of the future are now competing in Yugoslavia: the patriotic Communist one and the new, purely nationalist one. The only correct solution, though, is to create a third model, a democratic one. The democratic model will become the leading one after the other two have demonstrated their inability to solve the nation's burning problems.

– Very often, the reformists and Ante Markovic himself, are called "roosters" who have sung too early, implying their programme was presented prematurely...

– Someone has to come up with fresh ideas sooner or later, doesn't one? So far, no Eastern European nation has found a clever way to get out of Communism. Political reforms are easy to carry out. What is more difficult is to create an economic model of a future society. After Yugoslavia's constituent republics have found themselves without funds to live on, they will accept our vision: a free market democracy without any ideological colouring. If this model is set up in Yugoslavia, other Eastern European countries may find our experience highly instructive.

– Today, however, it is nationalist parties which are most influential in Yugoslavia.

– In the conditions when the ruling parties control the media, nationalist parties are more attractive to the people. However, the final word will be uttered by people's empty stomachs. When most

Opposition protesters chant anti-Communist and monarchist slogans

Photo from Time (USA)

people find themselves only a step away from the poverty line, it will turn to parties offering realistic and democratic programmes of economic change.

– In what way the Serbian opposition is different from opposition movements in other republics?

– In many Yugoslavian republics the opposition came to power in the wake of the nationalist upsurge. In Serbia, the Socialist leader, Milosevic, himself adopted nationalism as a propaganda weapon. That is why the opposition (even the nationalist parties) had to resort to purely ideological arguments. The opposition will become mature after people come to the polls to vote for it, not just against Communists. In addition, it should be remembered that after so many years of unlimited Communist dominance, the time of other political parties has not yet come. Despite all differences, the programmes of the opposition parties are very similar and stipulate democracy, freedom of the press, etc. But once society becomes democratic and these principles become a reality, the parties will start becoming more varied.

– Some people insist that multinational federations cannot be saved. In Croatia things went so far as armed confrontation between units of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Serbian police. Do you think the concept of an integrated Yugoslavia is dead?

– Not at all. Yugoslavia must survive as a federation. If someone opposes the federal idea, one cannot favour the concept of an integrated Europe which will eventually become a federation as well. As for Yugoslavia, I must admit, we have not lived a single day as a real federation.

– That is roughly what the Soviet president says about the USSR.

– It's nice to hear that. A federation can survive only under a democracy, in the process of radical economic reforms. Privatization of land, selling small businesses off to private owners may become first steps. If the Soviet Union does not carry out radical economic reforms, it will be in for more serious conflicts than those Yugoslavia now faces. Big and small nationalist leaders will be the key figures in such conflicts. But their ambitions will not feed the people.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent

BELGRADE

Bonn or Berlin?

It once seemed that the Unification Treaty clearly mentioned Berlin as capital of Big Germany

What will the government's moving to Berlin mean politically? Where will the parliament and government be housed? These are subjects of heated debates between the advocates of the "federal village" as they often call Bonn in Germany and advocates of Berlin as the capital of the country united at last.

Rumour has it that the very first alarm was sounded by the Bonn restauranteurs. The fear that they might lose wealthy regular customers from among the political, business and media quarters of the West German capital made the restaranteurs consolidate and form a pressure committee "Say Yes to Bonn." Another pro-Bonn faction unites influential bureaucrats who are reluctant to part with their comfortable villas scattered throughout the small and convenient resort town of Bonn.

An active brainwashing campaign started in order to influence politicians, Bundestag deputies and journalists into accepting Bonn as the future capital. The town of Bonn and the state of the North Rhine-Westphalia sponsored special expert calculations which produced a nightmarish figure of DM 50 to 60 billion – this is how much the German taxpayers would have to pay for the government's moving to Berlin, the experts insisted. Other arguments are generously provided as well: can one really suggest that the German capital be transferred to East Germany where unemployment and social tensions are mounting and where Soviet troops will remain for at least several years to come? If Berlin is declared the German capital, the opponents say, let the federal president move there and the parliament and government remain in Bonn.

The Federal Republic's president, Richard von Weizsacker, however, refused to serve as what he described as "a prop for the so-called capital" and stressed he would move to Berlin only together with the parliament and government. The president believes the radical changes taking place in Eastern Europe are a strong argument in Berlin's favour.

The federal president found support also from Hans Vogel, the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, who has called on Chancellor Kohl who has so far kept silent, on the CSU leader Weigel and the Free Democrats leader Otto Lambsdorff to speak out in support of Berlin.

The Berlin–Bonn rivalry will be resolved by the Bundestag. The lawmakers are expected to take a decision before the summer recess. The Berlin problem is one of the few issues in dealing with which the deputies are guided by personal interests, not political or party affiliations. The pro-Bonn faction in the Bundestag have already collected as many as 250 signatures on the bill stipulating the parliament and government offices remain on the banks of the Rhine.

The history of the Bundestag knows many an instance of unexpected voting returns, behind-the-scenes lobbying, party intrigues and a secret war which often goes as far as bringing off deputies.

In my opinion, no matter what the Bundestag may decide now, eventually Berlin will get the upper hand as the historical capital of a united Germany.

Meanwhile, real estate dealers are already active in and around of Bernau, a Berlin suburb which they believe would be a convenient location for government villas. And of all people, real estate dealers are the ones to watch if you want to make an educated guess...

Mikhail Podvigin,
our own correspondent

BERLIN

The first step is made by the stronger party

Shortly before President Gorbachev's visit to Japan almost all prominent Japanese experts in Soviet affairs made trips to Moscow. Prof. **Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,** from Hokkaido University's Slavic Research Centre, is a noticeable figure among them. At the request of *New Times* **Alexei BOGATUROV,** senior researcher at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, had a talk with the professor during his sojourn in Moscow.

Alexei Bogaturov. Different, even sceptical, views are expressed in our two countries regarding Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Tokyo. Many people believe that in the present situation it will be difficult to achieve a considerable improvement in our bilateral relations. What do you feel about that?

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. The Soviet Union has improved its relations with China and South Korea.

But for many years none of the parties had dared to show its strength. Why?

The absence of normal relations with Japan is the last hindrance to the success of its policy in Asia.

A.B. Moscow did not have to make any concessions when it was establishing relations with South Korea. The Chinese leadership proved wise enough not to bring its differences with Moscow to boil as happened in its dispute with Tokyo over the territorial issue. Do you think that in the present context Moscow can make concessions on the territorial issue?

T.H. The Soviet Union is experiencing a crisis of its economy and federation. The economic crisis makes it vitally urgent for Moscow to improve its relations with Tokyo, while the crisis of the federation makes it difficult for Gorbachev to make territorial concessions needed for an improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with Japan. The world is watching with interest how President Gorbachev will balance contradictory demands.

A.B. A poll conducted in the South Kurils

(Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai islands) and in the Kurils (Iturup Island) during the nation-wide referendum on March 17 of this year produced the following results. On the first three islands and on Iturup Island 81.3 percent of respondents were against the transfer of their territories to Japan. The turning over of the islands was favoured by 21.5 and 15.9 percent respectively.

The inhabitants of Iturup were asked whether they would go the mainland if their island was transferred to Japan. As many as 49.3 percent replied that they would leave the island, but almost as many, 44.1 percent, said they would remain. The results of this poll proved unexpected. Perhaps it would be reasonable to ask whether Japan is prepared to embrace the Russian population of the islands to which it lays claim and to guarantee them their rights.

T.H. I would draw your attention to another thing. After all, 68 percent of respondents in the South Kurils and 81.3 in the Kurils are against the transfer of the islands concerned to Japan. According to polls conducted by the newspaper *Asahi*, 52 percent of respondents in Japan favour the transfer of two islands to their country while another 20 percent think that the other two islands should be demilitarized and developed jointly. Thus, three out of four Japanese respondents believe that the present status of the islands should be changed in one way or another. The gap between the views of Japanese and Soviet people is evident and at present I see no basis for mutual understanding at the level of mass consciousness. It is especially important therefore to look for a compromise at the level of high-ranking politicians.

However, the people are beginning to understand where their real interests lie. I think the Japanese government must convince the inhabitants of the South Kuril islands that their rights will be safely guaranteed in any case.

A.B. To what extent has the political and public opinion in Japan matured to raise the question of a radical improvement of relations with the northern neighbour on the whole? I have a feeling that much is said in Japan about the need for reconciliation with the Soviet Union but little is done to help Moscow reach a compromise without losing its face. Oriental thinking predominates in the political traditions of Russia, and you know well what it means for an oriental to lose face.

At present Tokyo is trying to convince Moscow by any means of the need to meet the Japanese demands in full, that is, to transfer the four islands to which it lays claim. But for Moscow it is evidently an impossible task.

T.H. Japan's foreign policy is now in a transition period. It is being revised from the standpoint of post-cold-war realities. The transitional and unstable character of policy is being aggravated by a change of generations among politicians and by attempts to work out models of a new, coalition policy. It is therefore difficult to say at present in what direction Japan will move further.

A.B. This is a very interesting statement. But in what way does the present situation in Tokyo influence Soviet-Japanese relations?

T.H. It should be admitted that certain changes are taking place in Tokyo's policy. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has taken a series of initiatives with a view to improving relations with the Soviet Union. The foreign ministry has proclaimed the policy of a "balanced expansion" of relations with the Soviet Union in every field.

A.B. This was indeed so before early autumn of 1990. But then Tokyo toughened its stand again. Last year Tokyo seemed to think of preparing for a compromise if Moscow proposes to take the first step towards normalization by returning to the declaration of 1956, which provides for the transfer of two islands (Habomai and Shikotan) to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. But these hopes were dashed after Tokyo had again laid claim to the four islands. Why does Tokyo consider it necessary to adopt a maximalist stand?

T.H. First, there is a widespread view in Tokyo that the Soviet Union is more interested in Japan than Japan in the Soviet Union. The USSR plays a very small role in Tokyo's foreign and domestic policies. This explains why Tokyo could reduce its relations with Moscow to the territorial problem alone. Second, there is the force of inertia characteristic of the Japanese elite and bureaucracy. The world around Japan is changing, while Tokyo stubbornly adheres to old methods.

A.B. But during the oil shock in 1973 this force of inertia did not prevent Japan from quickly adapting itself to a new situation.

T.H. Tokyo and public opinion have not yet realized that the uncompromising stand, which prevailed over the interests of improving relations with the USSR, is detrimental to the national interests of Japan. Of course, some politicians in the ruling party and foreign ministry are beginning to understand that Japan is lagging behind international development. However, Tokyo is not revising its policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

A.B. You seem to be pessimistic about the possibility of forthcoming high-level meeting producing something positive?

T.H. Before September 1990 I considered myself to be a moderate optimist. It seemed that the two countries could find agreement on the basis of the "two (islands) plus x" formula, that is, the transfer of two islands in keeping with the declaration of 1956 and some additional measures, such as demilitarization and joint development of other two islands. However, it is difficult to remain an optimist after the resignation of Shevardnadze and the events in the Baltic republics.

A.B. Do you think that the crisis in the Soviet Union will prejudice the chances of success of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit?

T.H. The possibility of a choice has been reduced to the minimum. If Gorbachev chooses to settle the territorial issue he will be opposed by both conservatives and reformers. There is no confidence that he will be able to return to the declaration of 1956, not to mention the fact that the crisis in your country is strengthening

The Soviet military say that the Kurils are of strategic importance for the country
Photo by Vladimir Svartsevich

the positions of those forces in Japan who take a sceptical view of the necessity of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

A.B. Do you think that Tokyo will try to play on contradictions between the central government and Russia, between Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

T.H. I do not think that Tokyo will try to take advantage of this conflict for a territorial settlement. On the contrary, the struggle between the central government and the Russian Federation can become only an obstacle. The disagreement between Gorbachev and Yeltsin is obviously dissuading Tokyo from actively seeking reconciliation with the Soviet Union.

A.B. What is Tokyo expecting from talks, then?

T.H. The Japanese government believes that the return of the four islands, even if not immediately, is a precondition for final reconciliation with the Soviet Union which includes the conclusion of a peace treaty and the promotion of economic cooperation. Gorbachev is unlikely to accept such a variant. This will inevitably be followed by profound disappointment in the Japanese society. Such a turn does not serve either Soviet or Japanese interests.

A.B. Do you think that a compromise is possible?

T.H. It depends on how much both sides are interested in each other. It would be naive to believe that the territorial problem can be solved at one stroke. At best, the Tokyo meeting will open a dialogue. Both parties understand full well that the only realistic possibility for such a dialogue is to start from the declaration of 1956. It is tragic, however, that neither side is willing to take the first step for fear of internal political complications.

A.B. I also think that a solution through a return to the declaration of 1956 (the Soviet Union's refusal in 1960 to recognize it was illegal from the standpoint of international law) is simply in the air. Nevertheless, vying in senseless obstinacy, Moscow and Tokyo are afraid of taking the initiative. The USSR and Russia are probably afraid of doing that because of the painful understanding of its diminishing status as a great power, and Japan because of the no less fervent desire to rise above the country which has long tried to talk to it only from the positions of its military superiority. Is it the case of a lack of interest on both sides or simply two inferiority complexes? Psychologists know that the first step is taken by the stronger party. ■

PUBLIC OPINION

No hope for a substantial growth of Soviet-Japanese cooperation

A poll held among experts by the All-Union Centre For the Study of Public Opinion shows that in the near future it will be difficult to hope for a substantial expansion of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the economic sphere

According to opinion polls, 70 percent of Japanese respondents do not trust the Soviet Union as a political and economic partner and Japan's interest in economic cooperation with the USSR has been declining in recent years. In view of such an opinion, most experts stressed the urgent need to build a "psychological bridge" which, in combination with a "political" bridge, would lay conditions for imparting a new quality to Soviet-Japanese cooperation.

Speaking about new forms of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation, experts named the following forms as promising:

– small joint ventures for the output of import substitutes, for the manufacture of goods which can be sold in Japan and other countries, and in the service industry;
– free economic zones;
– enterprises with 100 percent Japanese capital;
– concessions;
– marketing and production and marketing cooperation.

Experts unanimously stressed that it is necessary to carry out not large joint programmes but small concrete projects.

Almost all experts consider that if the present situation remains unchanged in the Soviet Union any substantial Soviet-Japanese cooperation is practically impossible. The main reasons are:

1) the political, legal and economic instability of the situation in the Soviet Union;
2) the absence of a peace treaty, the outstanding territorial and other political issues in Soviet-Japanese relations;
3) different types of economic mechanisms in Japan and the USSR and the absence of market relations in the USSR;
4) the inertia of Soviet government bodies and enterprises which fail to carry out the decisions adopted earlier by both parties.

Experts named the following ideological and ethic factors which hamper Soviet-Japanese relations:

1) the ideologization of our relations, ideological myths widely held by peoople ("they rob us" and "we sell-out the mother country");
2) political and economic ambitions, the refusal to admit the dependence of economic ties on the solution of political issues and to recognize that the situation in the USSR is similar to that in developing countries;
3) the unreliability of Soviet partners, the inability to keep promises, and the failure to fulfill commitments made.

In the opinion of experts, the finding of an acceptable compromise on the problem of the Northern Territories is an essential condition for the development of Soviet-Japanese economic relations.

Experts also stressed the necessity of

– delimiting the functions of the central government, republics and local government bodies in foreign economic activity. The confusion in the Soviet Union's economic ties with Japan is largely connected with the absence of such a delimitation;
– providing guarantees of economic freedom to Soviet and Japanese entrepreneurs doing business in the USSR;
– paying off our financial debts to Japan;
– creating advantageous and attractive conditions for Japanese companies cooperating with the USSR;
– allowing free travel to a number of regions in the Far East, first of all Vladivostok, now closed for military considerations.

Experts were unanimous that, in principle, it is more advantageous for us to cooperate with big business. However, in their opinion, large companies have adopted a wait-and-see stand and will not start cooperation on a mass scale.

Almost all experts were rather sceptical about the idea of turning the Soviet Union into a "bridge" between Europe and Japan; most of them think that this is hardly necessary, not to mention the fact that it is hardly practicable.

The poll was conducted by N. Yershova, L. Kosals, O. Kuznetsov and I. Ryvkina

Russian Easter in Johannesburg

There are not many of them left – some 40 all told – those who come to the Russian House and the Church of St. Nicolas in Johannesburg. They have managed in this foreign land to preserve their traditions, faith, love for their native land and the Russian language

Walking into a small jewelers' shop on Oxford Street in Johannesburg, I cross back into old Russia. Icons, photos of the Tsar's family and alongside them – family photos of young, attractive men in Cossak garb hung on the walls.

My interlocutor, Lev Nikolaevich Krasnokutsky, is the curator of the Russian House elected by local Russian emigrants.

"Have you heard of the Krasnokutsky Cossak village on the Don river?" he asks, smiling. "My great-grandfather was the Cossak leader there. My grandfather was a lawyer in Nizhny Novgorod, and my father a doctor in St. Petersburg. Not a single Krasnokutsky forgot Russian traditions: mornings and evenings we prayed, donned Cossak garb for holidays and kept safe my great-grandfather's weapons and crosses. And even now, though we left Russia long ago, driven out by the Revolution, we remain true to Cossak custom, teach our children to be kind and just and try to instil in them a sense of honor and pride. Our children bear Russian names – Nikolai, Lev, Aleksei, Larisa. And when the air vibrates to the strains of Cossak songs, their eyes well up with tears.

Every person stands out as an individual in the Russian community. Much respect is heard in accounts of Victor Ivanov – artist, poet, musician and adherent of Russian culture who passed away last year. He was a member of the gentry and an officer in the Tsarist army who left his homeland because he didn't want to take part in the bloodshed of the civil war. I had the chance to look at his paintings produced over the span of many years. There were landscapes, still-lifes, and portraits from which one senses that the person who painted them was very kind, a person who never quite managed to free himself of feelings of profound sadness and melancholy. I was told by members of the Russian House: the soul of the deceased will find peace when that which he created is returned to his native land...

In conversations about life in South Africa, the names of the following were most often heard: princesses Yevgeniya and Aleksandra Tumanovs, the noblewoman O. Baikova and the Russian intellectual V. Shvetsov. In the words of Lev Krasnokutsky: "some are far distant, some are dead." But, he says, everyone here remembers that it is they who were the founders of the Russian community and that it is with the funds they gathered that the Russian House and the small church were built.

Drawing by Victor Kazachek

"The church," explains Ms. T. Taylor, once a Russian noblewoman, "brought together people with various past histories and strengthened their spirit. And although the church went through many difficulties, people did their best to keep it alive. The first minister was a man named Starikov whose post was later taken by Archimandrite Aleksei, a willful and authoritarian personality. He did a great deal for the faithful here. At the end of the 1980s he left for the US and died soon thereafter.

Since then, the church has not had a Russian minister. The limited funds available were spent on bringing in a minister from abroad, most often from America, but soon there was not enough money even for that. But the church nonetheless lives on. The first Sunday of every month services are held there. They are conducted by a Serb, Father Sima. He does not know Russian so he conducts his services in Old Church Slavonic. The parishioners nevertheless do not leave out a single rite.

What is of more concern is that between the New York synod, of which the church is a part, and the Belgrade patriarchate a silent war is being waged for authority over this small islet of Russian religious culture.

"And what of the Russian Orthodox Church?" I asked Ms. Tailor. "Did you try to establish connections with it or request its assistance?"

"No," came the reply. "We have had no contacts whatsoever with the Soviet Union. Perhaps now, though, there might be hope ..."

Parishioners are troubled over the fact that the once praised choir has been disbanded. It broke up because the community is growing older and those who founded it pass on.

"Our community is divided into the old and the young. The young are those under 50," Krasnokutsky told me sorrowfully.

On Easter day, the Orthodox gather in Johannesburg. Everything necessary on this day is prepared beforehand: Easter cakes are baked, eggs painted and everything is put in order in the church and the Russian House. With the words "Christ is risen," which will be heard here on April 7, parishioners express their hopes of seeing a rebirth of Russia.

Nikolai Reshetnyak,
our own correspondent
JOHANNESBURG

The red brotherhood



Hundreds of thousands of Khmers were compelled to leave their native land. At first, they fled from their own Communists and then fled fighting between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese troops

The events which have taken place in Indochina over the past few decades remain puzzling to us in many respects. The Khmer Communists, who liberated their country from US puppets, have proved to be fratricidal. Freedom-loving Vietnam, who enjoined sympathy all over the world instantly lost its aura after it moved its troops into Cambodia and installed a puppet government in Pnom Penh. The war between Vietnam and China dispelled the myth about the brotherhood of socialist nations. How did all of this come about?

Some 12 years ago Vietnamese troops drove Khmer Rouge forces out of the capital of Democratic Kampuchea (now called Cambodia again). A new government headed by Heng Samrin, leader of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, came to power in Pnom Penh. The crimes of the Khmer Rouge were so heinous that their utter defeat and ouster from the political scene seemed inevitable. The people had to throw off their unbearable yoke.

However, even 12 years later the Pol Pot group remains a serious political and, what is more important, military force backed by a large segment of the population. Pol Pot has roughly 50,000 well-trained, battle-hardened troops. Supplied with Chinese arms through Thai territory, they effectively resist government forces which are superior in numbers but inferior in training and combat spirit.

Why are Communists butchering each other in Indochina

The world community, shocked by the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, did not recognize the Samrin regime either. Only Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and India, from among non-socialist countries, opened embassies in Phom Penh. The opposition is politically supported by South-East Asian countries, China and a number other states and insists on participation in a coalition government. Multilateral talks on the future of Cambodia have been held for several years now, and the Khmer Rouge are confident that they will return to powers. Does this mean that Pol Pot is not hated by Khmers so much as it may seem from afar?

Fanatical intellectuals and illiterate peasants

Cambodia is not the only country over which a conflict flared up. The situation in Indochina has a specific feature, however. It is a conflict between

socialist countries. In spite of recent changes in the world, the feuding parties – Vietnam, Cambodia and China – continue to build socialism. In Cambodia, both the Khmer Rouge and the Pnom Penh regime are fighting for the right to build an advanced society based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. The constraction of socialism, which has been going on for 15 years now, has taken a toll of several million lives.

The rival parties naturally deny each other's right to be called Communists. An impartial analysis shows, however, that the fundamental tenets of the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists have never differed markedly. The following aphorism is attributed to the noted Hungarian philosopher György Lukacs: "Leninism is an adaptation of Marxism to the decisions of every next plenary meeting." In Cambodia, like on other islands of the Socialist Archipelago, the Marxist doctrine was twisted in such a way that any policy could be justified.

In September 1978, during a war between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge's propaganda department put out a book, called *The Black Paper*, describing Pnom Penh's clash with Hanoi as a continuation of the Khmer people's 500-year struggle against Vietnamese aggressors. Practically devoid of the usual Marxist rhetoric, the book interpreted the current state of affairs in purely nationalist terms, exposing "the real essence of Vietnam as an aggressor and invader." Hanoi naturally rejected such an interpretation of events. But when China invaded Vietnam in February 1979, Hanoi followed the same logic by talking about "the 2,000-year struggle of the Vietnamese people against the Chinese sway."

The readiness with which these countries dropped Marxist phraseology in critical periods emphasizes a characteristic feature of socialism in Indochina. It is socialism with a nationalist face.

It was not the Soviet Army which brought communism to South-East Asia. Communist ideology became an instrument in the hands of intellectuals who received their education in the West. These intellectuals, from Deng Xiaoping to Pol Pot, saw in it an instrument for the struggle against colonialism. The Communist parties in Indochina have never been working-class parties, because even in Vietnam, the most advanced of the three countries, the proportion of workers was too small. They were parties of fanatical intellectuals and illiterate and poor peasants. The national idea began to play a special role from the very outset.

Between Moscow and Beijing

The countries of Indochina found themselves in the centre of the struggle between Moscow and Beijing. Since the early 1970s, the two capitals have been vying for influence over Hanoi, which obviously began to take Moscow's side.

As for Cambodia, its skilful and amiable leader, prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was building his Buddhist socialism with the help of US dollars, suited both Moscow and Beijing. The small Communsit Party of Cambodia, which hid in the jungles, was not given much attention by Soviet and Chinese leaders. Moscow probably maintained low-level contacts with the Khmer Rouge through Hanoi. When Sihanouk was overturned in 1970, the Soviet leadership recognized the military regime of General Lon Nol (who was later called a US puppet) and kept its embassy in Pnom Penh until Pol Pot was overthrown, Moscow kept silent about the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.

Mao Zedong made an unexpected gesture by granting asylum to Sihanouk and simultaneously stretching out his hand to the Khmer Rouge. In this way Beijing demonstrated its anti-imperialist solidarity and won reliable allies in the future anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese campaign. Strangely enough, Zhou Enlai, the second man in the Chinese hierarchy, persuaded Sihanouk to join hands with his erstwhile enemies, the Khmer Rouge.

Chinese planes landed at the Pnom Penh airport soon after Pol Pot's victory and for a considerable period of time they were the only link between the new regime and the outside world. Bejing supplied Pol Pot with arms and everything he needed. In August 1975, Khieu Samphan, head of Democratic Kampuchea, flew to Beijing to sign an agreement under which China promised 200 million dollars to the regime. In a joint communiqué they condemned Soviet "hegemonism."

Alexei Kosygin and Norodom Sihanouk. In 1970, the prince flew into Moscow to find out that a military coup had just been staged in his country

Pol Pot meets with Hua Guofeng, leader of the Communist Party of China, in 1977. Faithful allies in the struggle against "Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonism"

Clashes between Khmer and Vietnamese troops, which seemed purely accidental at first, began in the summer of 1975. After their victory the Khmer Rouge unexpectedly sealed the border and killed everyone who tried to move to Vietnam. Pol Pot went to Hanoi and declared on his return to Pnom Penh that the fraternal parties had reached complete agreement. It was stated that clashes occurred through the fault of local army commanders.

However, the Khmer Rouge soon raised the border issue. The border established by the French suited Hanoi quite well, whereas the Khmer Rouge maintained that the Mekong's fertile delta and the Saigon area had been captured by Vietnam some time ago and, therefore, Pnom Penh had full rights to them. The Khmer Rouge wanted to govern a greater state.

"The Vietnamese must be destroyed"

"In September 1975, the first time I returned to 'liberated' Cambodia at invitation of the Khmer Rouge leaders," Sihanouk writes in his memoirs, "I was surprised to

Americans gleefully watched the Sino-Soviet conflict

Henry Kissinger clinked glasses with Andrei Gromyko...



but drank with Zhou Enlai

hear Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and Co. tell me... that their soldiers were 'unhappy' with the Party, because it would not give them the green light to recapture 'Kampuchean Krom', that is, Lower Cambodia (South Vietnam) as well as the border districts along the Thai frontier that had once belonged to Cambodia. Son Sen, vice minister in charge of national defence, claimed that his glorious 'revolutionary army of Cambodia' felt it could make quick work of General Giap's army, not to mention the Thai army." Son Sen described the "Vietnamese threat" as a "cancer eating away at Cambodia's body."

Quite a few Vietnamese lived in the border area, just as there were many Khmer villages on the other side of the frontier. Khieu Samphan told Sihanouk that "the Vietnamese cannot be allowed to live in Cambodia, the Vietnamese suspected of espionage in favour of Hanoi must be destroyed and all others expelled from the country." It was a terrible time for Cambodia.

Before the end of the second war in Indochina, Ho Chi Minh's diplomacy enabled Vietnam to avoid taking a stand with regard to the confrontation between Moscow and Beijing. After its reunification Vietnam had to make a choice.

In June 1975, Deng Xiaoping said that the Soviet Union had replaced the United States as the main threat to peace and security in South-East Asia and intended to set up military bases in the region. It was a warning to Vietnam. Le Duan tried in every way to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing. However, both the Soviet and China demanded that Hanoi take a definitive stand.

Vietnam emerged from the war with a ruined economy. Before the war it exported rice, and now the nation was starving and desperately in need of aid. Such aid could be provided only by the Soviet Union. In addition, it could also use the mechanism of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Le Duan went to Moscow, and Beijing was not slow in reacting to this visit. China laid claim to 127 little and mainly uninhabited Paracels Islands and to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Of course, the Chinese hoped to discover oil on the shelf. But, first of all, it was a means of putting political pressure on Vietnam.

Beijing grossly miscalculated by hoping to intimidate Hanoi. Of course, Vietnam found itself encircled by hostile states – China and Cambodia – and in a desperate economic situation: 1977 was harder than any year of the war. However, there was a way out for Hanoi. In the summer of 1978, Vietnam joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and simultaneously it began to receive large shipments of Soviet arms. Early in November 1977 Hanoi concluded a major treaty with Moscow. The treaty contained provisions on military aid. It was a death sentence for the Pol Pot regime.

The defeat of the Khmer Rouge

What did a Sorbonne graduate, Pol Pot, and his no less educated associates, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan, hope for the setting themselves against Vietnam? Vietnam, with a population of 50 million, had a 680,000-strong army, according to Western estimates. Moreover, its well equipped and trained army had valuable combat experience.

First of all, Pnom Penh counted on Chinese aid. In addition, the Khmer Rouge's easy victory (with Vietnamese help) over the demoralized government army played a bad trick on them. They came to believe that they had strong armed forces. Cunning and insidious as they were, complacent Pnom Penh leaders were not politicians. Emotions prevailed over a pragmatic approach. The desire to create a great Khmer state and take vengeance on Vietnam for years of former humiliation, when the Khmers fully depended on Hanoi, proved stronger than sober considerations.

In January 1977, the Khmer Rouge began a regular shelling of Vietnamese territory. By autumn the shelling had grown into genuine border fighting. In December, troops of Democratic Kampuchea made excursions into Vietnam, but then moved back. On December 31, 1977, Pnom Penh broke off diplomatic ties with Vietnam. There was an exchange of notes for some time. However, both countries inevitably approached a full-scale war.

In the opinion of Western historians, the

The fighting for Lang Son was a culmination of the Chinese-Vietnamese war

The strategy of the Cambodian campaign and the war against China was drawn up by General Giap

Deng Xiaoping in the United States: "We must teach Vietnam a lesson"

Photo from Der Spiegel

decision to invade Kampuchea was adopted at a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee in Hanoi on February 5, 1978. In April Hanoi radio called on the Khmers for the first time to overthrow the Pol Pot regime.

In the summer of 1978, Pol Pot carried out an extensive purge in the eastern border area, and masses of refugees fled from Cambodia. People ran to the jungles and Vietnam. In this way Hanoi found much needed allies among Khmers. They were led by Heng Samrin, who also fled from the eastern zone. He brought roughly 10,000 Khmers together under his banners.

Pol Pot had roughly 60,000 soldiers – two-thirds of his army was raised from young people in rural areas – against 12 Vietnamese divisions, or about 120,000 men. Pnom Penh relied more on revolutionary spirit than on military training. For this reason the Pol Pot soldiers could not effectively resist the essentially regular Vietnamese army. It launched a rapid and powerful offensive.

Why didn't China intervene?

On January 5, 1979, the Pnom Penh radio broadcast: "News of the victories of our revolutionary troops is received every day. We are confident of victory." Two days later Pol Pot fled, and Vietnamese troops entered Pnom Penh. Within three weeks they took all cities and roads under their control. In April, the Khmer Rouge were dislodged from all fortified areas. They could retain their positions only in sparely inhabited mountainous districts in the south-west and along the border with Thailand.

Why didn't China intervene?

In January 1978, the widow of Zhou Enlai came to Pnom Penh to sign an agreement on arms supplies. But in November, when Vietnam joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Son Sen, defence minister of Democratic Kampuchea, flew into Beijing for additional aid he was given a cool reception. Talks with him were held not by Mao's loyal disciple, Hua Guofeng, who entertained Pol Pot as a dear guest in October 1977, but by pragmatically-minded Deng Xiaoping. Pol Pot urged Beijing to send Chinese troops to Cambodia. However, Deng wisely refused.

Most likely Deng Xiaoping did not expect that the Khmer Rouge would suffer a crushing defeat. By the end of 1979, the Khmer Rouge and China too had lost the game. The Beijing establishment evidently felt stung and longed for vengeance. During his visit to the United States in January 1979, Deng pronouced his famous words about the need to teach Vietnam a lesson.

The tragedy of ethnic Chinese

Apart from Cambodia, Beijing had one more reason for "punishing" Vietnam. About one and a half million ethnic Chinese, huatsiao, lived in Vietnam. Like in other South-East Asian countries they preserved their national culture and language, maintained relations with their kinsfolk in the homeland, and engaged mostly in trade. Upon gaining independence, Asian countries began to demand that they adapt local citizenship and give up Chinese citizenship.

In 1955, the Central Committees of the two Communist parties agreed that the Chinese living in North Vietnam would enjoy all rights and gradually adopt Vietnamese citizenship. The Chinese were treated well in Vietnam. Moreover, they had an important advantage during the war. They were not called up for military service.

The attitude towards the ethnic Chinese began to change in the mid–1960s when the "cultural revolution" had started and groups of Red Guards had formed among the Chinese young people living in Vietnam.

A different situation arose in South Vietnam. Back in 1956 the Ngo Dinh Diem government demanded that the ethnic Chinese either adopt South Vietnamese citizenship or leave the country. Hanoi came out in defence of the rights and freedoms of ethnic Chinese. However, after North Vietnamese troops entered Saigon in 1975, the attitude of new authorities changed.

Those who insisted on their Chinese origin lost their jobs and food ration cards. All Chinese schools and newspapers were closed in the South. Ethnic Chinese became hostages in the political game between Beijing and Hanoi.

The Chinese were accused of keeping the economy of the South in their hands. Vietnamese officials called the Chinese "a strong capitalist heart beating inside the socialist body of Vietnam." It was decided to perform an operation on "the heart." In line with a decision of the Party's Central Committee a campaign for the "socialist transformation" of the South was launched. This meant nationalization and the confiscation of valuables. The introduction of a new monetary unit did away with all the accumulations and undermined the economy of the South, which soon became as poor as the North. In the North, the ethnic Chinese worked at factories and in ports. They moved closer to the border with China. But in 1978, Beijing suddenly closed the border, saying that the ethnic Chinese had the right to remain in Vietnam.

Hanoi thought that China was preparing to invade Vietnam and turn the ethnic Chinese into a "fifth column." In June 1978, the Party's Politburo called China "the chief enemy of Vietnam." After that the ethnic Chineese were simply driven out of the country. One of diplomats explained that Vietnam made use of the Polish experience: after the six-day arab-Israeli war, Warsaw organized an anti-Semitic campaign by accusing Polish Jews of sympathies with Israel, and compelled those who survived the horrors of Nazi camps to leave Poland.

On February 17, 1979, approximately 100,000 Chinese troops crossed the Vietnamese border. A decisive battle was waged over the strategic city of Lang Son. Fighting in the city lasted for three days. Beijing announced soon that it was pulling its troops out of Lang Son. However, they finally withdrew only on March 16, razing the city to the ground.

In spite of bellicose statements both sides did not want the war to last longer. Hanoi correctly understood that the Chinese attack was an attempt to let steam out of the boiler and that it would not be followed by another attack.

China tried to behave towards Vietnam just as the latter did in relation to Cambodia. It seemed at one moment that Hanoi had achieved its goal while Beijing had failed. Today, 12 years after the entry of Vietnamese troops into Cambodia, the situation seems somewhat different and resembles that in Afghanistan. The central government is unable to control the nation without Hanoi's help. After many years of the war, the opposition confidently lays claim to power, and the Khmer Rouge have a chance to return to Pnom Penh on legal grounds.

Leonid Mlechin

(To be continued)

HUMAN RIGHTS

A suspended visit

Vladimir Bukovsky who intended to come to Moscow on April 2 of this year was refused an entry visa, even though he sent the Soviet Consulate in London a personal invitation from Russian leader Boris Yeltsin. Legal explanations for the refusal are possible, for example they may refer to the fact that Vladimir Bukovsky had not served the whole of his prison term as he was expelled from this country. However, it is evident that the motives of the refusal were different.

Vladimir Bukovsky was exchanged for the First Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, Luis Corvalan, in mid-December, 1976. When they came for him at the Vladimir prison, Bukovsky thought he was being led to his execution. Then he was urgently airlifted to Moscow's KGB Lefortovo prison and shortly after that a special plane took him from the Chkalovskaya air force base near Moscow to Zurich where the actual exchange took place.

Bukovsky was 34 when he landed in the West; 12 out of these 34 years he spent in prisons, labour camps and mental hospitals.

At the end of March Vladimir Bukovsky contacted *New Times* by phone and granted this interview.

New Times. What was your life like after you landed in Zurich?

Vladimir Bukovsky. I spent the first six months travelling through Britain, Germany, France, the USA. When I was in the United States in Martch 1979 I met with President Jimmy Carter and the meeting was much spoken of. I wrote *And the Wind Returns...* – published in the autumn of 1978. Unfortunately, the writing coincided with the beginning of my study in Cambridge, which was highly inconvenient... In 1981, my second book, *Letters of a Russian Traveller,* was published. I received my diploma in neurophysiology at Cambridge and went to work at Stanford. At the same time I was busy writing books. Now I am back in Cambridge and I have not worked for a year: I write articles. In the summer of 1990 they published my new book, *The USSR: From Utopia to Disaster.*

N.T. At the end of the 1980s and even in 1990 the West was enthusiastic about Moscow's democratic reforms and many emigrants who had left the Soviet Union voluntarily or had been forced to do so hurried to return to their native country. However, nobody mentioned the possibility that you might come too then. Now that the whole world is talking about a Soviet shift to the right, you decide to come. Why? What is your logic?

V.B. I had no business to do in the USSR when most people here, in the West sang praise to perestroika and glasnost. From the very start, I have been well aware that the leaders and the people had different aims and that sooner or later the authorities would choose to backpedal on reforms they initiated themselves or at least limit the results they would not like. It was evident to me that perestroika was a temporary policy and, I repeat, there was no point in my coming back to the country at a time when euphoria reigned there.

My coming to the USSR at that time would have meant my approval of perestroika. Your magazine would have written: what a nice perestroika we are having, even Bukovsky has come to bless it. By the way, in 1987 your magazine accused me of killing US journalist Jessica Savitch. She died in a car crash and I never met or knew her... It was an amusing episode. I even wanted to sue *New Times* in New York.

N.T. I am really very sorry for what has happened... If you could get an entry visa, would you engage in political activity at home?

V.B. That's a difficult question to answer. What will other people think about me? It is not up to me, but to people to assess my abilities. I am a professional, a neurophysiologist and known in the West for a series of scientific books and papers. But I have also written analytical and political books and articles. I have campaigned in the West for boycotting the Moscow Olympics and against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Political involvement is part of my life. And I really don't care too much whether people perceive it as the most important aspect of my life or not...

N.T. Still, what would you like to do in the USSR?

V.B. I have not been to Russia for 14 years. Naturally, I watch Russia's evolution and I can say I have a fair impression of what's going on there. At the same time, I would very much like to come to Russia personally and see how things are going on. Politically, I support the current government of the Russian Federation and the declarations it made this year. That is why I think it is OK if I come on Yeltsin's invitation. I want to talk to him. I am prepared to help as much as I can. I am prepared to assist democratic forces: this comes naturally for people with biographies like mine.

Lev Yelin

Vladimir Bukovsky tells about his long struggle in the USSR. The story was recorded by Lord Nicholas Bethell soon after Bukovsky came to the West

"The Helsinki Final Act was paid for in our blood"

I was seventeen and in my last year of school in Moscow. I started this little magazine. It was done on a typewriter and consisted mainly of schoolboy jokes about the school and about the teachers. There was a slight touch of schoolboy irony and literary parody, but no more than that, nothing political. And there was just one copy. We used to get together and read it to one another. Then suddenly there was this amazing reaction from the authorities. Dozens of officials started descending on us, from the Communist Party, from the Ministry of Education; they set up committees of investigation, all about our little magazine. The result was that I was expelled, the headmaster was dismissed, and my father, who was a loyal Communist Party member, received an official reprimand.

For me it was one more illustration of the view I had formed several years earlier – that there could be no freedom or true happiness in a society run along the lines of the Soviet Union.

When I was expelled, they told me, "You must go through a period of manual labour in a workers' collective, to help your reeducation." They told me that I was formally banned from ever going to university.

This was when I committed my first act of resistance against the authorities. It became a question of honour. Why should people tell me what to do and what not to do? Why should I be a toy, a thing in other people's hands? So I found a way of fooling them. In the Soviet Union you can't get into university without a character reference. They thought they'd block me from university by not giving me this reference, but I got one in a roundabout way – at a young workers' evening school. There were kind people there who pretended they didn't know anything about my previous history.

An armed struggle?

Once I had this reference, I could enrol to take the entrance exam to Moscow University, and this is what I did, without telling a single soul. I managed to pass the exam and immediately registered as a student. By the time they found who I was, it was too late, I'd already registered.

While a teenager I believed in the "Hungarian way," I was in favour of an armed revolution against the Soviet regime. This is the first reaction to such a clear and obvious evil – a desire to annihilate it physically. This is the tradition of the various nationalist movements in the Soviet Union which have usually been violent. Their first impulse was to take armed action against the Soviet regime, just like mine, although I hasten to say that I never put it into practice.

But in the end I came to the conclusion that revolution is not only impracticable, but also senseless and harmful in Soviet conditions, where there is no public opinion, no free forces and where most people are ignorant of politics. What would revolution bring in place of the present regime? Probably fascism or military dictatorship. I think that each man in Russia has to realize that he is part of the system and the system is part of him. So obviously it cannot be changed by force. Something has to change inside the thinking of the citizen. This is where political change is beginning, I believe, and it is only later that it is expressed in organized movements. The hope is that the Soviet man's conscious mind will evolve. It is a very slow and gradual process, but it is taking place and the best thing that anyone of us can do is to try to help it.

Farewell, Moscow University!

I studied biology for one year at Moscow University, before they expelled me. At the same time I was organizing regular readings of unpublished poets in Mayakovsky Square. We read usually on Saturdays and Sundays, and sometimes there would be several hundred people listening. You must remember that this was in 1960-1961, at the height of the literary revolt, which was the first reaction to Stalin's crimes. There was great interest in the writers and poets who had been banned under Stalin – Dostoyevsky, Pasternak, Mandelshtam, Gumilev, Akhmatova, Bulgakov, Hemingway and others – and it marked the beginning of "samizdat" (self-publishing), which in those days was a purely literary phenomenon and only later came to be used politically.

We had no permission to conduct these readings, but they didn't stop us. They couldn't really, or at least it would have been very difficult, because there were so many of us. Several times there were fights when the police tried to break us up and once they formed a chain to stop people getting into the square. But then in the autumn of 1961 there was a new Party Congress and one of the decisions was to clamp down on this sort of thing. Five of the organizers were arrested, including two of today's well-known dissidents, Vladimir Osipov and Edward Kuznetsov, the one who tried to hi-jack an airplane in 1970. I

In the Lubyanka corridors

wasn't arrested, but there were articles about all of us in the national press, saying what bad people we were, and I was expelled from Moscow University.

At the beginning of 1962 something came out during the trial of one of my friends and an order was issued for my arrest. I heard about this and decided I wouldn't wait for them to come for me, I would run away. So I joined a geological expedition on the other side of lake Baikal in eastern Siberia. I worked as a labourer with this expedition and came back to Moscow in the autumn. The fuss had died down a bit and I was able to get a job as a laboratory assistant. I wanted to complete my studies in biology and become a biologist.

A month at Lubyanka

Then I was arrested on June 1, 1963. The reason for this, apart from what they had against me over the poetry readings, was that they found a copy of Djilas's book *The New Class* in my possession, a Russian-language edition, published in the West. I was given this copy just for one night. Then I would have to hand it on. I knew I would not be able to read it in one night, but I had a camera, so I decided to photograph it, page by page, and read it at my leisure. So I made two copies, just for myself. The KGB came to know about this and soon they came to search my flat.

I was charged with "being in possession of anti-Soviet propaganda for the purpose of distributing it." They found two copies and so they asked me, "If you wanted to do it for yourself, why didn't you just make one copy?" That was just an aggravating circumstance. Being caught in possession of the book was already ground for arrest. So they took me to the Lubyanka in Dzerzhinsky Square. I stayed there a month in solitary confinement. And they put it to me straight. If I told them who "I'd got the book from and who'd helped me with the photography, they'd let me go. If I refused, I'd be charged." I refused, so they started the legal process of bringing charges against me. But because their evidence was rather feeble, or maybe because they didn't want a trial of that type at that particular moment, they sent me for a medical examination.

This was a time when many people were being sent for psychiatric examination. Khrushchev had just said, "We have no opponents of our system. All we have is a few mentally ill people." I think that some people in the West thought that Khrushchev was making a joke, but in the Soviet Union what he said was taken by the police as a directive. It meant that hundreds of people were sent to psychiatric hospitals.

The Perm labour camp

I spent a month in the 4th Department of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Medicine in Moscow. This is the political department which is run by a certain Dr. Lunts. Usually they are under orders to commit their "patients" for treatment and they try to get it over with as quickly as possible. I was only interviewed twice, for about an hour each time. If you talk in a frank and open way, they call you a paranoic. If you're quieter and more reticent, they call you a schizophrenic. They try to push you into one or the other category. Towards the end of 1963 I was sent to the Leningrad Psychiatric Hospital.

In a mental hospital

It was very unpleasant there. I was locked in a room with two other men, both really insane. One was a Ukrainian nationalist. He'd been in prison for 17 years, in solitary confinement, and he'd gone out of his mind. All he did was shout slogans the whole time, nationalist slogans – "Down with Bolshevik slavery," "We demand freedom and amnesty," "We demand a free and independent Ukraine." He spent most of his time drawing or carving some Ukrainian heraldic crest on his cell wall. The other man just sat there and giggled the whole time. He had murdered his children, then cut off his ears and eaten them.

But one of the worst things there was the hypocrisy of the doctors and orderlies. Officially you were a mental patient, not a criminal, so they couldn't apply the usual process of "reeducation." With a criminal they would try to persuade him to repent, to admit he'd done something wrong. With us they tried to persuade us to admit that we were really mentally ill. They used to ask us, "Don't you understand that you are ill? The sooner you come to understand your illness, the sooner you'll be cured and the sooner you'll be out of here."

Another part of the hypocrisy was that there were no punishments. Obviously a mental patient cannot be punished, because he cannot consciously do anything wrong. So if you get in the way of one of the orderlies or answer him back, he goes to the doctor and tells him that you're "overexcited." Then they give you an injection of some drug to "cure" your overexcitement. The effect of these drugs is very painful and sometimes lasts for days.

After the mental hospital I had a few months as a free man, then I was arrested again in December 1965. Amnesty International intervened on my behalf and I was released the following August, but then I was arrested in January 1967 for demonstrating in Pushkin Square on behalf of four dissident friends – Ginsburg, Galanskov and two others. This time they gave me three years in a labour camp and I wasn't released until January 1970. After that I was free for quite a long time, 429 days, before my final arrest in March 1971.

The KGB kept a very close eye on me during these days. If I went anywhere by car, they followed me ostentatiously, tailgating me, just so that I would know I was being watched. They had a man standing permanently by the entrance to our stairway, with instructions not to let any foreigners in. One time I met a journalist and the

KGB arranged for some hooligans to attack us, to break up the meeting. But I still managed to give interviews and was working on my book about the misuse of psychiatric methods.

Early in 1971 the KGB sent me a message that they would be glad to arrange for me to go abroad. They wanted to be rid of me. But I refused, and it must have been then that they finally decided to arrest me and give me a long sentence. They picked me up in March. I remember that this time they were particularly crude and aggressive. On previous occasions they tried all sorts of methods, including flattery, bribery, persuasion and promising that they would arrange me a wonderful career. But by now they realized it was useless and they reverted to their old methods. They shouted abuse at me. One of them took out a revolver and threatened to shoot me on the spot

In January 1972 I was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and five years' exile.

In a labour camp

I spent the first two years in Vladimir prison and then I was transferred to a Perm labour camp. Things were easier in the labour camp. Prisoners could move about and communicate. The food was much better. Several of us were writing pamphlets, getting paper somehow and smuggling them out to our friends for publication in "samizdat." Ivan Svitlichny gave a talk on Ukrainian nationalism. Lev Yagman gave one on Zionism. And I worked with Semyon Gluzman, who is a psychiatrist, to produce our *Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents*. We smuggled it out bit by bit in various ways, some of it in disguised form in private letters to friends. We got it all out, but unfortunately a complete copy was soon in the hands of the KGB, and this meant that they could have put me on trial at any time and given me another term of imprisonment.

Then some of us organized a strike. We managed to get word to other camps in the area and we all went on strike during the spring of 1974. Our demands were connected with the camp administration, our rights as prisoners. There were no proper hospital facilities, no surgeon, no blood plasma. An old Latvian called Kurkis, who had been in prison for 23 years, was sent out to work even though he had a stomach ulcer. His ulcer perforated and he lay there for 24 hours without a blood transfusion before he died.

But our strike was also connected with President Nixon's visit to Moscow at that time. We had high hopes that the United States was going to insist on internal reforms in the Soviet Union as a condition of detente and economic assistance. There had been a resolution passed in Congress to this effect.

Several people were released from mental hospitals just before he arrived. But Nixon left without raising this question, and immediately they were all put back into the hospital. I have to tell you that this American policy of detente with the Soviet Union was positively murderous as far as the human rights movement in Russia is concerned. It was a complete betrayal. All this East-West trade is paid for in our blood.

A punishment cell in the Perm labour camp for political offenders

Photos from Time (USA) and Observer (Great Britain)

A half-an-hour trial

I've heard Western statesmen saying that we have to accept "reality." The West should accept ordinary human values and do its best to persuade other countries to adopt these values too.

People in the West do not understand how nervous the Soviet authorities are of them. The only reason why the prison authorities in Vladimir behaved within certain limits – for instance, they don't usually beat prisoners up – is that they knew that we are all political, that we have contacts with the West and they are afraid of generating a scandal. In other prisons terrible things happen, worse than in Vladimir, but no one in the West is going to hear about it so it doesn't matter to the authorities... When the Helsinki conference was over, the treatment of political prisoners worsened.

There were several dozen of us transferred from Perm to Vladimir after the strike. To move me to Vladimir they had to change my sentence, which meant they had to have a new trial. But it was a farce, and old-fashioned three-man tribunal with no lawyers, no witnesses, just a prosecutor and a prison officer. The judgement said that I had behaved "in a negative fashion" and shown disrespect for the administration. I had five or ten minutes to state my case and that was the end of it. The whole thing lasted no more than half-an-hour.

After I was taken to Vladimir in May 1974, I started work on a "charter" for political prisoners. We were in cells and it was very difficult to communicate with the other prisoners, but we managed to do so using the pipes and the walls and various other devices, and we smuggled it out of the prison in mid-1975. The idea is to get some special status for political prisoners recognized under international law and included in various human rights conventions.

I am not in favour of overturning the Soviet regime. Nothing I've done has been in violation of Soviet law or of the Soviet Constitution, which in theory guarantees full freedom of expression. What has happened is that the Communist Party has usurped the functions of government. It is they who have violated the Constitution, who are "anti-Soviet," if you like.

Personally I am not a socialist, and it is not for me to suggest that the Russian people, when it finally gets this chance, should choose this or that party. If they choose a socialist or even a communist party after free elections, I will accept this as the will of the people, so long as there is rule of law and I am free to disagree and put my own point of view, although I must say that after all this has happened in the Soviet Union I don't think that communist ideas would have much chance. The human rights movement is the only one which could give Russia any such way out.

Sentenced to murder

Who brought guilty verdicts in the thirties to the fifties

Alexander Larin,
Professor, D.Sc. (Law)

This year's issue No.2 of *New Times* carries my item on how in September 1941 the Military Judicial Board of the USSR Supreme Court composed of Vasily Ulrikh, Dmitry Kandybin and Vasily Bukanov sentenced a large group of political prisoners held in an Orel jail to be shot without a trial. As I leafed through the book *The Rule of Law in a Socialist State: the Concept and the Ways of its Materialization* (Moscow, 1990), I came across a piece of information which shed new light on one of the threesome: in the same year of 1941, Vasily Bukanov, as a member of the same Military Judicial Board, which included beside him, A.A.Cheptsov and M.R.Romanychev (chairman), acquitted Mikhail Kedrov who had been arrested by the NKVD. The authors of the book described this as "an act of real civic courage which, in those times, could have dangerous consequences for them." "Vasily Bukanov," I read on, "paid a dear price for his courage later. He was removed from his post and put behind bars, to be rehabilitated only after 1953."

Well, who was Bukanov – an executioner or a victim?

Acquitted but shot...

Speaking of those "inquisitors" who, in their turn, suffered from repressions in the thirties to the fifties, it would be simplistic to categorize them merely as "executioners" or "victims." Many executioners later shared their victims' fate. "As they carried out their repressive 'missions,' the officers of the state security service who executed or witnessed the execution of Stalin's criminal orders were eliminated. The first to be wiped out was Yagoda, who had framed up many prominent Party and government leaders; he was followed by Yezhov, the organizer of the monstrous mass relpressions of 1936–38. Stalin made them into 'traitors' and 'enemies of the people,' responsible for illegal repressions. By eliminating those men and thousands of investigators and other officers who had committed illegal acts on Yagoda's and Yezhov's instructions, Stalin killed two birds with one stone: first, he got rid of those who knew too much about his crimes and, second, he shifted onto them the blame for mass repressions... Those who were opposed to mass repressions were also eliminated," write historians Vasily Maslov and Nikolai Chistyakov.

The judges who acquitted Kedrov were spared, however. They never became victims, probably for the reason that Beria regarded their verdict as a trifle which did not merit attention. Although acquitted, Kedrov was held in prison on Beria's instructions and promptly executed. Shortly afterwards, Bukanov made up for whatever displeasure they may have aroused at the top: within just two months of Kedrov's acquittal he and his colleagues – Ulrikh and Kandybin – dutifully carried out Stalin's personal order to "sentence" to death 170 innocent inmates of the Orel jail.

General A.A.Cheptsov fulfilled such instructions on more than one occasion. The case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee is a milestone in his career. Everything happened in 1952, as the Stalin era was nearing its end. Ignatyev, the then Minister of State Security, informed Cheptsov that the Politburo of the Central Committee wanted 13 defendants out of 14 sentenced to be shot. The court, with Cheptsov in the chair, complied with the Politburo's instructions: thirteen of our fellow citizens – revolutionaries, statesmen, scientists, writers, actors, anti-fascists and patriots, were labelled traitors and spies and summarily executed.

As to Cheptsov, he made it to the top of the ladder and retired as Chairman of the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court in 1955. In subsequent years he was often invited on special occasions to attend various functions as a bearer of glorious traditions, an honoured veteran and as an example for young judges to emulate.

Romanychev, who had been the chairman at the trial of Kedrov, also sailed through his career quite smoothly.

Witness lands in the dock

Bukanov served on the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court all through the war. Upon the expiration of his term of office, he was not re-elected to the USSR Supreme Court, however, owing to his weakness for alcohol. Drunkenness did not cut his army career short though: Bukanov was made a legal adviser to Vasily Stalin, then in command of the air forces stationed in the Moscow Region. The commander turned a blind eye to weaknesses like that – and, besides, he hardly had any legal problems to cope with.

Bukanov settled down to a new service routine and presently took part in a court trial again, this time in a new capacity. In June 1949, he was summoned as a witness to a special session of the USSR Supreme Court which tried a number of former members of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on charges of bribe-taking. An investigation revealed that as a member of the Military Board, he had frequented hangouts, together with a friend of his, accepted gifts from crooks, gave them rash promises, and signed applications on their behalf with his rank and position indicated in full. The court was under the impression that the witness was hardly any better than the defendants. The special session of the USSR Supreme Court instituted legal proceedings against Bukanov on charges of bribe-taking and abuse of office. Bukanov was taken into custody. Preliminary investigation was carried out by the USSR Procurator's Office. Then Bukanov went before the criminal board of the USSR Supreme Court. The members of the board took a different view of the case. They arrived at the conclusion that Bukanov's encounters with those who wanted him to intercede for criminals brought to trial, and who had wined and dined him to secure his cooperation, were not connected with the performance of his duties and, therefore, could not be regarded as illegal offences. On September 22, 1951, Bukanov was acquitted and released from custody right in the courtroom. Records of the proceedings are still kept in the archives. It follows from them, without question, that (1) bringing Bukanov to trial was by no means con-

Drawing by Vladimir Soldatov

nected with his past handling of criminal cases; (2) the state security service had nothing to do with the criminal prosecution of Bukanov; and (3) all that happened long before the year 1953 and, consequently, there is no reason to put Bukanov in a class with the rehabilitated victims of the Stalin-Beria repressions.

In 1951, when Bukanov was acquitted, Beria held the posts of Politburo member, Secretary of the Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers responsible for political repressions which he perpetrated on Stalin's personal instructions. Setting any prisoner free against his will was absolutely out of the question.

Vacillating with the "general line"

Bukanov and Cheptsov appeared to be inconsistent in their administration of justice: they acquitted Kedrov, but shortly afterwards Bukanov sentenced to death the prisoners held in the Orel jail who had committed no crime, and Cheptsov sent innocent members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to their death.

Let us try and disclose the motives for their behaviour, and the logic of their actions. After all, underlying motivation is no less significant than what comes of it. What kind of people were they? Wilful petty tyrants appointed to judicial posts at random and prone to acquitting or convicting defendants on impulse? Not at all; they were neither amateurs, nor impulsive.

Mass repressions, accompanied by political demagogy, had among their results the selection of people of a special kind - conformists. For a conformist the stand taken by his superior, his boss, his leader is the ultimate criterion of good and evil, of truth and delusion. It was with such conformists that Stalin and his henchmen manned the command posts in the Party and in the state machinery. They proudly called themselves "the soldiers of the Party" and demonstrated their readiness to toe the Stalinist "general line" without a moment's hesitation. If they vacillated, they did so along with that line, repeating the zigzags of the policy pursued by the powers-that-be. How was it that Kedrov was acquitted in such a psychological atmosphere?

His was an unusual case, even by the standards of the times. More than two years had elapsed bertween the time of his arrest and the day he was put on trial, although other political cases were usually rushed through the courts. One could presume that the Kedrov case had caused a secret conflict in the echelons of power. Besides this, memories were still fresh of Stalin's recent statement at the January 1938, full session of the Central Committee in which he had hypocritically condemned sweeping repressive measures taken against Communists. No sooner had Yezhov, executionist No.1, been shot for "illegal repressions" and buried in an anonymous grave, than Kedrov – a close associate of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky who had never been in opposition to the government faced trial on obviously trumped-up charges. The military judges afforded the luxury of being bold enough to acquit him. In all probability they didn't know of the omnipotent Beria's being interested in the Kedrov case. In July 1941 in the confusion of the first weeks of the war, Beria might well have overlooked the case. Then he recollected it, and Kedrov was no more. Incidentally, Cheptsov, Bukanov and their colleagues learned their lessons from that case. They knew from then on that they had better not acquit political cases.

Upon being instructed by the Ministry of State Security to try Jewish anti-fascists on charges of high treason and espionage, Cheptsov saw at once that the whole thing was a frame-up, but decided to act with more circumspection. He asked Malenkov, Secretary of the Central Committee, to receive him. Cheptsov did not as much as mention the possibility of acquitting the defendants. He merely asked for Malenkov's permission to re-examine the case. His reasoning was that the State Security men had made their bed, and now they could lie on it. But Malenkov told him that the Politburo had already pronounced the defendants guilty, and that the Military Board had to act accordingly rather than "to reason why." The General clicked his heels and returned to his office to write the verdict under which 13 innocent people were shot. Another 13 murders were committed under the guise of legality.

Let us not labour under the delusion, though, that now, after two "thaws," the building of mature socialism and perestroika we have said goodbye to such practices once and for all.

As I already wrote, it was not in the thirties or the forties, but in 1990 that Lieutenant-Colonel Zybtsev, a miltary prosecutor, came to the conclusion that the sentencing of prisoners of the Orel jail to death by Ulrikh, Kandybin and Bukanov "cannot be classified as a crime" because "the verdict was passed on the grounds of a resolution passed by the State Committee of Defence." I wonder whether Lieutenant-Colonel Zybtsev would be prepared to sign such a verdict on instructions from above?

It is a well-known fact that conformity and free-thinking are poles apart. In the sphere of the judiciary, free-thinking manifests itself in the independence of judges and investigators and an unhindered exercise of the right to defence in court. However, the campaign to rehabilitate dissidents condemned in the sixties, seventies and eighties has fizzled out (incidentally, Lieutenant-Colonel Zybtsev serves in the Rehabilitation Office). Suggestions that such important guarantees of judges' independence as irremovability and suspension of Party membership be consolidated by law have been rejected. All sorts of barriers are being put up in the way of introducing trial by jury who would decide cases in law courts independently of the judge and, consequently, of the Party and state hierarchy. The prospect of passing the long promised law on setting up an investigation committee which would remove the investigators' current dependence on the procurator's office, state security agencies, the militia and the local government bodies remains dim. The rights of counsels for the defence of criminal cases are being curtailed.

We shall hardly guarantee ourselves this way against fatal miscarriages of justice and other crimes committed under the pretext of strengthening law and order and promoting legality. All the more so, since there are still enough of the above-mentioned "soldiers of the Party" in our law-enforcement bodies to last us our lifetime.

The unforgettable Tarkovsky

Andrei Tarkovsky

Photo by Valery Plotnikov

Neya Zorkaya

He died four years ago – a period long enough to forget an ordinary person in our rapidly changing world, but not an eminent personality

Andrei Tarkovsky was born in the village of Zavrazhye, near the town of Yurievets on the bank of the Volga in 1932 and died in Paris in 1986, where he was buried at the Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois cemetery.

He rests far from us. Other Russians who came from the region of the Volga, Petersburg, Penza, Moscow, Kiev and Novgorod have been buried under Orthodox crosses in that Russian necropolis, not far from the French capital. Many of them are glorious people, the pride of their mother country. The surprising fate of our contemporaries, sons and daughters of Russia was noted by the well-known poet Osip Mandelshtam.

Four years is a period enough to forget an ordinary person in our rapidly changing world, but not an eminent personality. Disputes and passions have not yet subsided. We feel the loss more and more tangibly. No wonder that an exhibition organized in his memory by the Central Museum of Cinema and the Tarkovsky Society fund in the Moscow Cinema Centre (it was also demonstrated in Berlin last January) was called "Nostalgia for Tarkovsky." "Nostalgia" is the title of his second last film, Tarkovsky shot in Italy.

April 4 is Tarkovsky's birthday. He would be sixty years old next year. In the spring, admirers of Tarkovsky's creative work again gather in the town of Yurievets for "readings" and meetings of recollections. There are many such admirers in all parts of his country, and ethnic conflicts did not affect these gatherings in memory of Tarkovsky.

Andrei Tarkovsky made only eight feature films and staged only two plays (Shakespeare's tragedy *Hamlet* in Moscow and Moussorgsky's opera *Boris Godunov* in London's Covent Garden). He wrote a book about a film maker, entitled *The Sealed Time*, as well as a few articles. It does not seem to be a great legacy. However, research on him will not apparently be exhausted for some time to come.

Tarkovsky's creative work is obviously a major artistic phenomenon that will become a valuable part of 20th-century art. Purely artistic discoveries in the cinema language, a new type of a modern philosophical film-meditation, the combination of profound thought and constantly persecuted "intellectualism" with sincerity and emotionality – all this makes up "the phenomenon of Andrei Tarkovsky" which has not yet been unravelled to the end.

Reality of the future

There were moments when Tarkovsky displayed profound foresight. A long time ago I was at a May Day party which was also attended by Andrei Tarkovsky. He stood at the window and intently watched the rain. Those present shouted in chorus "I like a storm in early May", demonstrating their wit and knowledge of the famous verses by the poet Tyutchev. But Andrei remained serious and said: "It's unpleasant to think that it will be a radioactive, lethal rain, and that the hair of people will fall of because of it."

The Chernobyl "rain" indeed fell on our country. Or let's take *The Sacrifice*, a film Tarkovsky shot in Sweden shortly before his death. Eye-witnesses from the shooting team told me in amazement how they, together with Tarkovsky, chose the place in Stockholm for the mass scene of an explosion. According to the script, the scene was to have occurred on a bridge. But for some reason Andrei did not like the bridges shown to him and chose a staircase in the central part of the city. Nobody understood why he insisted on shooting the scene on the staircase. Several days later, three metres away from the place where his camera stood, Olof Palme was assassinated.

Let's also take the sinister character of the Zone in the film *Stalker*. Those who saw this film earlier must have recalled it after the terrible accident at the Chernobyl atomic plant. They regard as symptomatic not only the appearance of a huge

dead and dangerous space. Such a scene is described in the novel of the Strugatsky brothers, which prompted the plot of the film. It is also interesting how the idea was implemented in the film-making process.

At first, Tarkovsky wanted to find such a zone in Central Asia. Indeed, an amazing place resembling the moon landcape was found in the desert. But eventually the episodes were shot on the grounds of an ordinary neglected power station near Tallinn. A desolate place, where life and work thrived only yesterday, proved more terrible than the sand dunes and craters. The cheerless, cluttered and dirty dwellings in settlements near the Zone, widespread diseases, mutant children and despondence resemble our own, Soviet, post-Chernobyl scenes. Don't they bring to mind scenes on the shores of the dying Lake Aral or barracks in which miners live?

Tarkovsky's main foresight lies not even in these amazingly true and recognizable features of the background. The main thing lies in what constitutes the essence and meaning of film parables about fortune-seekers in the Zone and their guide. It is a moral theme of our personal "responsibility before the Zone" in the fatal time of global disasters, in the dazzling light of the End.

Some close relatives, including his father, were surprised at Andrei's liking for science fiction because, as a film director, he had a subtle feeling of real life, its nuances. It is clear now that for Tarkovsky a film-maker, fiction was not at all a flight from reality but a reality of the future.

Carried away by the idea of making a screen version of *Solaris*, created by Polish science-fiction writer Stanislaw Lem, Tarkovsky wanted to show both the interplanetary station in the Galaxy, where the scene of action is laid, and the mysterious "thinking ocean," the planet of Solaris – as usual, inhabited places, because the film is not devoted to space explorers and technological miracles. The subject of the film is different. It discusses the question of whether we – burdened with our weaknesses, prejudices and guilt before our near relations on Earth – have the right to fly into the universe. That is why a meeting with the cosmic twin of his dead wife on earth becomes a moral test for the main character of the film, an astronaut-scientist, its central plot. True, speaking about Tarkovsky's films, one can use the word "plot" only by stretching a point, because they are antipodes to thrillers.

Some 20 years after the film *Solaris* was shot we see cosmonauts orbiting the earth, working in space and even feeling bored and making serious mistakes which are luckily corected in good time. It can be said that people gradually accustom themselves to space.

A legend about the incomprehensible

He looks at the planet
As if the heavens
Refers to the sphere
of his night concerns

This verse of Boris Pasternak, another poet warmly loved by Andrei Tarkovsky, conveys the high thoughts and feelings and permanent concern over the issues of man's talent. His films, lyrical, subjective and unique, are a sort of blend of the emotions of a single human soul with time, history and eternity. This irritated people who like "simple" and easily understood films. Hence the legend about the "incomprehensibility" and "complicatedness" of Tarkovbsky's films. I think people will understand them better if they go to see them today. They are as clear as a song.

A scene from the film *Andrei Rublev*

Not long ago the film *Solaris* was again shown on television. One gets the impression that it is a film based on a modern subject. But here is what Andrei Tarkovsky wrote in his diary on August 12, 1972, after *Solaris* had been completed:

"Yesterday N.T. Sizov (then director of the Mosfilm Studio – **N.Z.**) acquainted me with the complaints expressed about *Solaris* by various officials – from the department of culture at the Party's Central Committee, from Demichev, the Committee (for Cinematography – **N.Z.**). I wrote down 35 suggestions. If I took all of them into account (which is impossible), nothinbg would remain of the film. The suggestions are even more absurd than those expressed about Rublev:.

1. Show more clearly how the world looks in the future (this is not clear from the film).

2. Not enough location shots of a planet of the future.

3. To what camp does Kelvin belong – the communist, socialist or capitalist?

...5. The concept of God must be removed from the film.

...7. The concept of Christianity must also be removed.

...9. The following changes should be made in the final scene of the film: a) Chris must return to his home; b) it must be clear that he has fulfilled his mission.

14. The scene of Harey's suicide must be made shorter;

15. The scene with mother is unnecessary;

The bed scenes must be made shorter..."

And so on until point 35. Andrei Tarkovsky found time to reproduce the long list of suggestions and ended it with the words: "This is really killing. What a provocation! What do they want from me to agree with all these suggestions? They know pretty well that I will never do that."

The Soviet regime was unable to make Andrei Tarkovsky a complaisant man. His obstinacy and implacability irritated the superiors. For only Ivan's Childhood (1962) his debut as a film director, went off cloudlessly. It was awarded the Golden Lion of St. Mark at the Venice festival (the only grand prix since then). Tarkovsky's permanent conflict with the authorities began with his second film, *Andrei Rublev*, probably his most important work. The film shot with inspiration over a year lay on the shelves for six years under a strict ban. It was first shown only in 1971. I think that the disease, which led to the untimely death of Tarkovsky, was caused precisely by the senseless and cruel ban on this indisputable masterpiece.

The superiors raged even stronger. Tarkovsky's colleagues and even friends tried to persuade him into making at least some concessions. I remember with shame how I advised him to cut part of the wartime newsreels included in his film *The Mirror*. The newsreels show the hard crossing of the Sivash. The shabby and tired soldiers walked in the water knee-or waist-deep.

I advised Andrei to show another crossing, say in snow, so that the superiors would not be angry. Being an educated and restrained man, he kept silent but, luckily, did not replace that part of the film. It is one of the strongest scenes in the film. Together with the verses "Life, life," by his father Arseny Tarkovsky, which he reads himself, it gives a vivid picture of the people's suffering.

Resistance and opposition were traits of

his character developed in the struggle against the increasing oppression. Harassed by constant pretensions, he had to justify himself and defend his views. It was totalitarianism in action, in the field of art. The activity of the "command-bureaucratic apparatus" consisted in surveillance over the people under its control. This practice was established with the founding of the Soviet state cinematography, right after nationalization when the central repertoire committee, body of party censorship, was set up.

Incompatibles

Tarkovsky was to experience personally the practices of Goskino of the USSR in the late post-Stalin era as the so-called democratization of the early 1960s, which served as a ray of hope of a thaw, grew into a satiated self-complacent only the head censors of the Stalin film screening in the Kremlin could doom a film to be shelved, in previous days, now every censor had his own private movie lounge and, as people joked with irony at the time, a censor's mother-in-law could axe any film she did not thoroughly comprehend.

Andrei Tarkovsky came face to face with this obtuse, powerful machinery, a man who understood cinematography as a calling, a man with a unique poetic view of the world, a man with the divine gift of a creator of beauty, a man of great talent. He was neither a "leader" nor "dissident," he did not speak out at meetings and at that time the concept of public rallies did not yet exist. He remained silent, preferring ostracism, solitude and destituteness to compromise, which was the only thing in those days that could have made things easier for him. Did cinematography authorities realize what they had in their grasp, what an artistic treasure they possessed? I think they did, at the very least some did (or else they listened to the West where people truly did understand). And they tried to make use of him, to lure them into their various traps. I recall well how the Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva, who ran the film industry during the shootinbg of *Ivan's Childhood,* tried to convince Tarkovsky to shoot a film for a Komsomol jubilee after which he would, it was hinted, be able to film that which he wished. The head of Goskino, Filipp Yermash himself told about what then happened, how his discussions went regarding a possible film on Lenin. But Tarkovsky and "films made to order" were two diametrically opposed concepts. His ideas were regularly and methodically turned down by Goskino, as if in spite.

Tarkovsky's diaries, published posthumously in Germany, were titled by his *Martirolog* that is "martyrdom". Alongside the list of pretentious for the films he did shoot, the diaries contain a graveyard of unborn creations, tear-wrenching lists of ideas proposed by him but rejected by those who had the power to do so. Each entry brings one pangs of grief. They include: (from 1970):

1. *The Gang* about the Martin Bormann trials. 2. A physicist who becomes a dictator. 3. *House with a Tower* (based on a story of Friedrich Gorenstein – **N.Z.**). *Echo in the Forest. 5. The Deserters. 6. Joseph and His Brothers. 7. Matryona's Home* based on a work by Solzhenitsyn. 8. About Dostoevsky. 9. *White Day* – as quickly as possible! 10. *A Raw Youth* based on the Dostoevsky novel. 11. *Jeanne d'Arc – 1970. The Plague* based on work by Camus.

Of this list of promising ideas, only one was destined to be reified – White Day which became the film *The Mirror.*

After his last packet of ideas, which included, inter alia plans for a film version of Dostoevsky's novel *The Idiot,* a long-held and dear idea to Tarkovsky, was turned down he accepted an invitation by the Italian film RAI-TV and left for Rome. After that he was not ever to return to his native land. But no, he did not bend under the pressure of producers armed with fat wads of money. A genius has difficulties wherever he may be. (Incidentally, it is horrifying to imagine Andrei Tarkovsky amidst today's "business cinematography" with its slogan "everything for sale.")

But in his seven years in the West, although he remained as uncompromising as far as his work was concerned as he was at home, and never surrendered to pesky and pernicious commercialism, he shot two more great films. He demonstrated that same "world responsiveness" that Dostoevsky saw in Pushkin. He produced one of the greatest creations of Russian literature *Boris Godunov* which was acclaimed as an innovation on the European stage, he published a book which become a valuable part of the world's collection of works on cinematography. And when he became bed-ridden with a serious illness literally several days before his death he continued to think about beginning work on his own film version of *Hamlet.* Opposition to one's surroundings – that is the most sacred lesson of Andrei Tarkovsky.

Painful questions for an aching heart

Academician Nikolai Inozemtsev would have been 70 on April 4, 1991

The director of a leading research centre – the Institute of World Economy and International Relations – Academician Nikolai Inozemtsev died at the age of 61. His death was unexpected: the academician was still able and willing to do much.

I met Nikolai Inozemtsev in 1945. We were both fresh from the war and students at one institute. Later we were to meet quite often: the fate chanced us to cooperate in journalism, science and politics. Since the late 1960s our acquaintance grew into a close cooperation and personal friendship.

Nikolai Inozemtsev was a prominent scientist, his works devoted to the problems of world economy and foreign politics remain as topical today as they were yesterday. In a sense, Academician Inozemtsev was the herald of what is now known as new political thinking: his scientific and political efforts helped to prepare the coming of perestroika. Since the late 1960s, Academician Inozemtsev sounded the alarm about the negative tendencies in the Soviet economy, in particular about the slow pace of scientific and technological progress due to the national economy's immanent resistance to things new.

Academician Inozemtsev was not afraid of raising delicate and painful questions in those hard times, and his sincerity earned him both enthusiastic followers and furious opponents. I remember vividly Academician Inozemtsev's speech at one CPSU Central Committee plenum where he castigated this country's foreign economic policy. Several highly-placed bureaucrats could never forgive that speech. However, by making it, Inozemtsev did not make enemies in the foreign trade department alone. He dared to actually speak, not read a preliminary written text at the plenum (as

ar as I remember, that was the only such nstance). He was eloquent, and clever and uninhibited when he spoke from the plenum rostrum and many CPSU apparatchiks regarded this as a challenge.

People like Inozemtsev live long lives even if they die young. Their lives continue in their works and scientific ideas, in the collectives they had assembled and headed, in their disciples. Academician Inozemtsev was, beyond doubt, the creator of a new original school of thought in the science about the world, global economy and international relations.

He was a fair and kind man. He was strong and never wavered in his convictions. Yet he was a vulnerable man.

In this connection I cannot but mention the last year of Nikolai Inozemtsev's life which must have aided his death. The political atmosphere in 1981-82 was becoming more and more suffocating. This was especially felt in the sphere of social sciences where neo-Stalinists and militant dogmatists launched an offensive. Their positions were strong in the ideologically-oriented departments of the CPSU Central Committee, in particular in the Science Department.

Nikolai Inozemtsev had a lot of enemies and many people were jealous of him, and not at the Central Committee alone. To his foes' sheer joy (or maybe with the help of some of them) two young staff workers of the Inozemtsev institute were arrested on political charges. Immediately the Politburo formed a commission to look into the institute's activity (the commission was headed by a Politburo member, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, Grishin, and the CPSU's ideological watchdog, CPSU Central Committee Zimyanin). The commission's investigation became a months-long ordeal for the academician and concluded with a package of condemnations.

Two months later Inozemtsev, then only 61, died of a heart attack. I am sure his enemies' intrigues had brought the death closer.

...I miss Nikolai Inozemtsev so much, I missed him with a special acuteness in the turbulent and dramatic time that started shortly after his death. His death was an irreparable loss for Soviet science and politics. But how can man resist the most formidable an unescapable that exists – death? The only resistance to death is keeping alive memories of those who have passed away. And, remembering how fragile man's life is, to cherish the living friends.

Georgy Arbatov

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

In this issue we return to the legacy of one of the founders of modern sociology, Pitirim Sorokin. We present excerpts from his article "Influence of Hunger on the Socio-Economic Organization of Society." The article was a part of a broader survey on the influence of extreme circumstances (famine, war, economic collapse) on the social structure, political and cultural systems, ideology and spiritual life of society. (see *NT* No.50/90). Materials of Sorokin's survey first appeared in the Petrograd-based journal *Ekonomist* in 1922. In the same year the journal published the discussion of Sorokin's doctoral thesis. By that time his name had already become well known in Europe and America and many foreign colleagues regarded Sorokin as the rising star of the booming sociology.

Pitirim Sorokin became a classic of sociology in his lifetime – the fate that did not befall many of his less happier colleagues. Unfortunately, though, Pitirim Sorokin made his brilliant career away from Russia, in the countries where talent is really valued.

However, Sorokin was not unnoticed in Russia either. First, he was "noticed" by the Tsarist okhranka – secret police – for his leadership in the Socialist Revolutionary Party. His services to the revolutionary movements earned him a recognition in the form of a prison term and exile. Although he did take an active part in the left movement, Sorokin advocated moderate views and abhorred both the radicalism in the SR party and the Bolshevist extremism. When they came to power, the Bolsheviks could not fail to remember Sorokin. He was arrested several times and even sentenced to death, but survived by a miracle. During the civil war no political activism was possible and Sorokin had to reject politics and devoted all his time to science. Nonetheless there was no way to escape politics (by that time sociology had been already loaded with ideological bias) or the dreadful CheKa, the Bolsheviks' secret police who kept an attentive watch over the editors and contributors of *Ekonomist*. Lenin personally supervised *Ekonomist* and other intellectual publications. Eventually, all intellectual journals were closed down and scientists, philosophers and journalists who had worked for them were expelled from Russia in 1922.

After a short stopover in Prague Sorokin moved to the United States and his talent blossomed there. Sorokin lived in the USA until the end of his days but he did not forget Russia. It was to Russia that one of his last works was devoted.

The article we present today was devoted to the American Relief Association, Fridjof Nansen and all others who participated in saving the people of Russia from the 1921 famine. In the form of "sociological theorems" Sorokin demonstrated that hunger was a factor in the evolution of authoritarian regimes, that the system of rationed food distribution and people's total dependence on the state produce a vicious circle: the rulers strengthen their power, while the ruled get bogged down in poverty.

This publication is prepared for publication by Andrei Edemsky, Cand.Sc.(Hist.).

The land of the empty belly

Pitirim Sorokin (1889–1968)

One rather frequent social effect of mass hunger is the changed economic structure and accordingly completely changed socio-political structure of the starving society. These changes are, firstly, growing governmental intervention and regulation in the citizenry's economic-food relationships and not infrequently thereby into other aspects of their social relationships; secondly, society's growing centralization and bureaucratization; thirdly, accordingly the declining or decreasing of economic autonomy and self-determination of society's members.

In other words, mass hunger not infrequently entails the transition of a range of food-economic (and other) relationships between society's members from the private legal domain where issues are decided by the authonomous volition and private agreements of the citizenry, to the public legal domain governed in a centralized fashion by the authority, with the inevitable application of coercive measures. The extent of its rights, interference and wardship grows, while the extent of the rights of citizen autonomy and "self-determination" declines with personal initiative and individual volition replaced by decisions handed down by the authority. In the field of production, exchange, distribution and consumption of food and economic boons generally private volition and its ensuing "anarchy" is ousted by the will of the authority and by state planned economy. Authority and its "heads" commence in these circumstances to define what should be produced, how and how much, how the produce should be distributed and how it should be consumed. Accordingly, inevitably reduced are the individual's rights as regards possession, use and allocation of the means and implements of production and circulation, and equally of the means of consumption, which thus infers the infringement or annulment of the right of private ownership and a range of other property and mandatory rights. To a great or lesser extent private capitalist society is transformed into a coercive-state or state-socialist society, or "an organized society devoid of the anarchy of production" and competition between private businessmen.

Along with these necessary conditions, of great but additional significance are other circumstances: the character, stability, and permanence of the population's behavior (its reflexes), the stability of the apparatus of authority, the degree of the organization and strength of the hungry and the well fed segments of society, etc. Should, for instance, "ownership reflexes" implying acts of restraining from seizing, using and allocating the wealth of "others" be firm and strongly "implanted" in the population, that particular circumstance would impede the drastic modification of the aforementioned modification of the social organization; but if they are weak and often easily undercut that would serve to reveal tendencies leaning towards socialization. Should further the extent of the organization and social strength of the richer segment be low, that would fail to seiously impede the "socialization" demanded by hunger; should, on the contrary, such organization and strength of the rich segment be considerable, it would serve as a greater impediment, which at times would be so much so that the tendency towards socialization being implemented in practice by the hungry or under their pressure could be almost completely "impeded." In such cases all efforts by the hungry masses would amount to nothing when coming up against this obstacle in the same way as the waves are dashed into nothing when breaking against a granite cliff.

However, from the aforesaid it is still obscure as to why, given these conditions, hunger can and should generate such a phenomenon? In short, we have the following. Given unquenched hunger whether of the individual or the mass of hungry people, there emerges a powerful craving or "thrust" towards edible objects (or their equivalents, as for instances the money that may be used to buy food) in order to seize these objects and quench hunger. This craving or thrust is one of the strongest in any hungry organism. It is practically insuperable... It, in concreto, may assume diverse forms depending on a range of actually obtaining conditions. When hunger may be quenched by importing food from abroad the craving for food spurs activity directed towards increasing imports. When hunger may be quenched by having the hungry emigrate to the well-fed countries, intensified emigration from the starving region begins. When the "food mountain" does not go to the hungry Mahomet, the last will himself gravitate towards the "food mountain." When military conquest or the looting of well-fed societies leads towards this objective, war breaks out as the social function of the mass craving of the hungry for food or for the quenching of hunger, etc. However, when none of this is within reach and does not lead towards the objective (which often occurs) then the self-same craving of the hungry to quench hunger impels them to seize the "food hoards" or their equivalents which are to be found within the starving society. Insofar as no other resources can be drawn upon, hunger can be quenched only at the expense of those sources of food that are available within the country. Were other means within reach, the shortage of food would be met and the division and socialization of such resources would not be necessary. However, when such means are blocked and out of reach, no other alternative remains.

The less a nation has to eat, the more coercive the state

Understandable therefore is the significance of the first aforementioned necessary condition (the condition when it is impossible to quench hunger by other means). Hence likewise understandable is the significance attaching to the second condition, namely the presence of property differentiation. However, should this be non-existent and should all in the country be equally poor and hungry, then there will be nothing of those "food magnets" and their equivalent capable of attracting the hungry and impelling them to seize them; in that case there would be nothing to attract, nothing to socialize, nothing to level and divide. However, should property differentiation be extensive, should there be alongside of the hungry rich and well-fed segments possessing resources and wealth, that will inevitably attract the eye of the hungry; directly or indirectly the "food magnets" (and their equivalents) will begin to attract and prod the hungry to seize them and quench their hunger at their expense. With all other conditions equal, this craving of the hungry to seize them will be all the more intensive the sharper the inequality of property ownership.

Impelled by hunger to seize "food hoards" and their equivalents the poor may accomplish their objective firstly by "direct action" implying violence, rebellion and revolution, secondly, by bringing pressure to bear on the authority compelling it to provide them with food at the expense of the wealth of the well-fed segment insofar as there are no other sources, or thirdly, by getting the rich segments to voluntarily yield their resources, hoards and wealth to the poor gratis (any extensive degree of which is regrettably extremely rare)... The first two options directly or indirectly result in the studied transformation of society towards etatization. When a revolution is successful, having abolished the authority standing in the way of the seizure of food hoards and riches, the poor create their own dictatorships, their own authority which broadens its intervention endlessly, socializes and divides hoards to benefit itself and the hungry in a straightforward fashion, by restricting the right of citizen autonomy in the economic food sphere and other fields extremely so. In that case growing centralization and intervention by the authority on the one hand, and the restriction of individual autonomy and rights, on the other, are inevitable. The history of "successful" revolutions directly confirms that.

When a revolution is abortive and the authority quells it in that particular case growing state capitalism also becomes essential; indeed, to quell revolution it must have troops and a pretorian guard; in turn, to have this force, it is necessary to feed it; to feed it, it has to take the food from within the country itself (as nothing is coming from outside) and it becomes necessary to intensify the coercive-requisitionary apparatus of power, its intervention, regulation, stock taking, control, and centralization not infrequently to a point when the government completely monopolizes the entire food industry. For otherwise there would be nothing with which to feed the pretorian guard and without that this guard would scatter and the authority would lose its mainstay. No authority can completely dismiss the pressure the hungry masses exert and not succumb to it to one or another extent.

Now and again it is itself prepared to meet their demands in the way as there exist no other resources except those available inside the country, the authority is obliged willy-nilly to intervene in economic food relationships, to inventorize resources, index prices, requisition and "socialize" all that is available inside the country (inasmuch as the authority itself usually does "not plant or reap, but only gathers into its granaries" what others plant and reap) in short assume control of the food industry either wholly or partially, now and again fully monopolizing this industry. In turn that signifies the extension of the authority's regulating functions and powers, the contraction of private individual economy, mounting centralization and the replacement of a liberalized economic structure by a coercive-state economy (Zwangswirtschaft). In short, this implies the start of society's indicated transformation.

Hence to a certain degree it is understandable why given the indicated conditions mass hunger causes society's social and economic organization to approach the coercive-state type...

The 19th century was a time of development of the individual's freedom and autonomy par excellence, a time of individualism, of the unprecedented growth of individual initiative, private ownership and free commerce and industry. In short, this was a time marked by a sweep decline in government fostership, regulation, intervention and regimentation, as regards both economic food relationships and other relationships.

The said facts are universal knowledge and need no proof. Though there were times when coercive etatism temporarily increased, these were of short moment and subsequently, as we shall see further, occurred only when the menace of hunger and food difficulties increased in the society in question.

Further, even in these countries and especially the best-fed countries, such as the U.S.A. and Britain, coercive etatism was at its lowest while "individualism," "private initiative," "freedom of the individual" and "the freedom of occupation and commerce" were highest. A noteworthy coincidence! And conversely. Countries like Russia, which even in the 19th century failed to emerge from their chronic state of starving societies, were lands where civil rights and autonomy were negligible and where the fostership, regimentation, centralism, intervention and despotism of the authority were hypotrophied. Again a most eloquent coincidence!

True, by way of objection, I might be told that precisely in the 19th century the state broadened its regimenting function and began to intervene in the economic field more energetically than ever before. "Never before had the state had so active an industrial and commercial policy," such people say adducing as arguments the legislation enacted, which was concerned with the protection

of labour, insurance, a minimum wage and the state monopoly of telephones, telegraphs, railways and the like.

A naive objection, I will reply. Firstly as regards food relations of interest for me, in the 19th century the authority's regimenting and monopolizing role in the indicated states was most drastically curtailed compared with the role it played in the aforementioned "hungry" societies. That cannot be questioned. Secondly, taken in their entirety all the regulating functions played by the state in these countries in the 19th century were negligible compared to the same functions in the afore-described "hungry" societies or in those self-same European countries in hungrier times. Surely there flourished in the 19th century "freedoms of speech, the press, association, assembly, religion and other individual rights," which in the "starving" societies were wholly regimented and are regimented by the authority. Surely in the 19th century the "guarantees" afforded for the inviolability of the person which place definite, extremely narrow boundaries on the authority's intervention in citizen conduct were most widely implanted. It is pointless to demonstrate truisms in detail.

On the other hand, the state monopolies that exist today are but a pitiful remnant of the erstwhile richness of government monopolies. The state has long been in charge of roads and railways. It has likewise long since exercised the function of caring for the poor. The same holds for other state monopolies today, except for such as for example, on telephones and telegraph that did not exist at all before. Look at the extensive range of other monopolies which a "hungry" or military state exercised before! Religion was its monopoly, the press and education were its monopolies, thought and mentality were its monopolies, in short the subordinate had to believe, think, learn and speak whatever was prescribed. The scholar, the artist, the poet were officials of the state. It also governed virtually the entire sphere of economic life leaving but little to private initiative and supervision!

Food shortages foster despotism, and the result is a vicious circle

The same link may be observed in the history of our Fatherland. In years when hunger intensified (ceteris paribus) given the existence of property differentiation coercive etatism gathered impetus in one or another form in our land too. The following socio-economic processes have served and continue to serve to denote its upsurge:

1) The government increased the regulation of food imports and exports. 2) The authority set prices for grain and food (indexes). 3) Several various coercive measures were taken by the authority as, for instance, the compelled declaration of food resources, their inventorization, the establishment of a ceiling, the forced marketing, the defined limit of purchase, the requisition of grain and food and other restrictions on rights of ownership, searches... plus other measures of intervention by the authority in the regulation of food economic conditions... 4) The state sought to sell food cheaply or issue it gratis ("free meals")... 5) The state organized socio-state work. 6) Common ploughing and "communes" were organized, the "state farms" and the "collective farms" are nothing new. Thus, according to the edict of 1827, initiated was the communal ploughing of fields which were subsequently fertilized, tilled and harvested under contract by the entire community under the surveillance of a special agent...

If we detail more extensively the measures the afore-indicated skeleton incorporates the picture revealing their growth will be thrown into still sharper and clearer relief. This may be done by selecting any hungry epoch in our history as, for instance, the times of Alexei Mikhailovich and Peter the Great.

One aspect was the increased coercive etatism which was expressed in the economic food sphere; firstly, by the state monopoly on grain and other items of prime or secondary necessity; secondly, by the apportionment from above of the amount of grain, cereals and other items that should go to one or another region, and so on; thirdly, by coercive requisition when food apportionment and the food tax were not observed; fourthly, by having the state control the growing of the entire amount of grain on "tithe ploughlands", where it was sown, reaped, inventorized and so on, by the direct agents of the authority; fifthly, by regulating the sowing and increasing the harvest by coercive measures (the contemporary "planting campaign" and "coercion by conviction"); sixthly, by gathering into the state granaries the harvested and requisitioned grain, by exact state inventorization and control, and by the state's allocation of grain as regards its destination, recipient, the amounts bought and sold, the price and so on; seventhly, by state victualling for office workers and rationing; eightly, by firm prices of grain ("the edict price"); and ninthly, by crediting grain operations by the state, with it often supplied to the needy on tick with, however, the state often providing but poor grain, yet exacting dry good grain. In short, what we observe, is full state "planned" economy, with no room for private volition and consideration.

This "tightening" of the coercive state press resulted subsequently in the "tightening" of all of social life (in connection with the wars). The entire country was militarized. Society's freedom and autonomy fell.

We observe a similar yet perhaps still more drastic upsurge in coercive etatism in connection with the hungers (and the war) under Peter the Great. In his reign fostership of the citizenry as regards body and soul was all-embracing.

Finally, recent years afford a most eloquent illustration of the tested theory. When war broke out in 1914, the food situation in all the belligerent countries deteriorated.

Coercive etatism necessarily grew especially acute in Russia where very shortly after the war began food difficulties arose that soon developed into a crisis. This upsurge began, in the main was stimulated yet before the October Revolution by the tsar's ministers, the Duma and the Provisional Government, even though they advocated free commerce and industry. The October Revolution added nothing new except class rationing and intensified centralization. Everythging was done prior to October 25, 1917. The laws of necessity compelled these decrees to be implemented by men far removed from the ideals of coercive etatism.

Later everything proceeded as if on greased skids. The October Revolution, in view of the mounting hunger and the existence of property differentiation, merely climaxed the procees, subjecting everything across the board to etatization and communization. The laws of necessity compél persons and governments of diverse trends and views to do one and the same thing. Indeed, "people are troubled, but are motivated by the laws of necessity." By 1920 everything in this country of ours was levelled and socialized. Hoards of wealth ceased to exist. Universal poverty dawned. A new bourgreoisie had yet to emerge. There was nothing to etatize.

According to our theory, this immense decline in property differentiation should have reduced coercive etatism. The conditions for levelling coincided with the close of the war and thus led to this self-same de-etatization. As we have seen this began and developed with feverish swiftness. If not for the hunger that year, this unwinding of the coil of state etatism would have proceeded still faster. However, hunger intervened, which explains the many factual discrepancies between contemporary practice and decrees. From the aforesaid we forecast the future: Ceteris paribus should the country continue to grow richer, and hunger decrease, and should withal property differentiation be moderate, the extent of de-etatization whatever its form and whatever the authority under which it occurrs, would slide down the more quickly, the more rapidly the first processes proceeded. In the case of mounting hunger and growing property differentiation, de-etatization will not decline.

One presumes that everything said will suffice to recall how correct is the saying which runs: "nothing is new under the sun." What many thought and still think unprecedented and absolutely novel has taken place before, my reader, many a time at that! There change only the settings, the actors, the costumes, the time and the locale; yet the play acted is the same acted many a time before on history's stage.

The lofty name "political scientist"

Leonid Ionin

We have too many political scientists. One wonders just where they all have appeared from. There were no political scientists five or so years ago. Today every third political article or commentary is signed "political scientist so-and-so."

What is a political scientist? Sounds like a scientific profession. But some doubts are creeping in. One is trained to become a professional, and unlike in America, universities in this country have never had any departments of political science.

As far as I know Soviet universities do not have political science departments now either. Instead, there are chairs of political sciences, formerly the notorious chairs of scientific communism. They must be the inexhaustible source of political scientists.

They might be. But one should not forget the principal difference between political science and scientific communism. Scientific communism tells us how one *should* organize and execute a socialist revolution and build socialism which harmoniously evolves into communism. Political science is what is called an empirical science. It studies what happens in politics *in reality* and exactly how it happens.

The difference between scientific communism and political science is similar to the difference between theology and experimental, psychological or sociological study of religious confessions. Accordingly, scholars of scientific communism are priests and preachers, and political scientists are researchers.

It is really amazing how soon scientific communism became political science in this country. Amazement aside, though, one soon understands that the change of name does not necessarily mean a change in actual profession. Even if we suppose that thousands of scholars of scientific communism have defrocked all at once, this does not mean that all of them automatically became political scientists. Political science is a science. And one has to study to become a scientist.

Since we don't really have prefessional political scientists and, moreover, we cannot possibly have them because of the specific policies in the field of social sciences pursued in the recent decades, a question has to be answered: what does the term "political scientist" mean in the Soviet context?

I believe that "political scientist" is a name tag worn by the innumerable brotherhood of propagandists of various political affiliations, which sew sientific frills to the carnival costumes of the current political leaders.

Political scientists Soviet-style fall into three major groups: pedants, mystics and moralizers. The pedants use arguments from the arsenal of state and legal theories and believe that the chief value of a politician or a policy is meticulous observance of laws and, above all, the constitution.

The mystics are populists. People is their main political concept. The benefit of the people is the supreme goal of politics. Being close to the people is the main virtue of a politician. These are obscure and really mystical categories.

The moralizers, as the name itself suggests, believe that morality must be the pillar of politics and that policies must be based on shared human values such as "thou shall not kill," "thou shall not steal" or "thou shall not lie."

A more appropriate way to describe the three groups of political scientists is to describe them as three schools of the Soviet political science. The arguments of any of the three schools are made an extensive use of by any of the possible political trends.

Indeed, it is very convenient to be a pedant and a legalist upholding the constitution: there is no place in this country where at least two vying constitutions are not in force simultaneously. That is why a pedantical political scientist only has to pick up the constitution that suits him most and beat the opponent with a scientific commentary on the necessity to honour laws.

The situation with the benefit of the people is almsot the same. Everybody advocates the benefit of the people. In the past, Communist Party committees on all levels were the only specialists in the concern for the benefit of the people. The Communist Party wisdom "Be pals with the people" has been adopted by the democrats now. People are pressing flesh with Yeltsin who is more of a pal than Gorbachev. However, Yeltsin and Gorbachev both share one and the same background – the Communist Party career.

The spectre, if not an effigy of Lenin is always to be seen at the meetings of Communists and all those described as right-wingers. This is also a mystical element. The democrats are starting to indulge in the mysterious too: the Moscow evening daily *Vechernyaya Moskva* has written recently: "Observers note that while Boris Yeltsin was delivering his televised address, the ghost of Sakharov sort of hovered over him." This masterpiece was signed by two names and two titles: "political scientists."

I am not going to tell you how political scientists teach morals. Everybody knows it, for examples abound.

Does this mean that all our political commentaries are ideologically biased and that all the political scientists and analysts are simply agitators? Fortunately, not. We do have real political scientists. But their sober reflections about political **realities** are percepted by their more exalted counterparts as political **programmes** and rejected for the sake of what is merely desired. The sober word burdened with knowledge remains unnoticed and misunderstood.

I am not going to stick labels on concrete people, defining them as real or false political scientists. I only want to warn: if an article is signed by a political scientist take your time to think where this political scientist comes from and what he or she promotes. Otherwise we will never learn to distinguish real science from propaganda, knowledge from magic and political sorcery.

And fear paralyzes thought

Marquis de Custine on pre-glasnost glasnost

Alexei Adzhubei

Historical analogies make it possible to throw bridges across centuries, but such links between the banks of the past and the present means nothing to you if you still prefer to wade across.

If you got stick in the river's muddy bottom, it's no use to spur your horse on in an attempt to reach the promised land on the good old off-chance.

Marquis de Custine made a tour of Russia in 1839. His book, which saw the light of day 150 years ago, can today be described as notes by political journalist. I leave it to the reader to judge whether they apply to our times.

"Multitudinous and minute precautions, obviously believed to be necessary here but not found anywhere else, made it perfectly clear that we were entering an empire gripped by fear, and this grip is inseparably connected with melancholy. Out of politeness, in order to share in the overall mood, I felt afraid and despondently sad at one and the same time."

"In Russia fear substitutes for, or rather paralyzes, thought. When fear reigns supreme, it can create only a semblance of civilization."

"Russia is ruled by a class of civil servants... From the recesses of their offices, these invisible despots, these pygmy-tyrants are oppressing the nation with impunity."

"Considering all the pains taken to erase the memory of the past, I find it surprising that some of this memory still exists."

"As one sees imperial absolutism being superseded by bureaucratic tyranny, one shudders to think of the future of the country on the soil of which the administrative system, implanted by Napoleon's empire in Europe, has thrived so prodigiously."

"It is considered good form here to sing praise to the Emperor's ancestors and to denigrate his immediate predecessors."

"Until now I have believed the truth to be as vital to man as the air and the sun. My tour of Russia has shaken this conviction. Telling lies here means to protect the throne, and telling the truth – to undermine society."

"It will take some 150 years to bring the situation there in conformity with modern European ideas – on condition that throughout those long years the Russians are governed by enlightened monarchs and friends of progress..."

"The Russian system of government is strict military discipline instead of civilian rule; it is permanent martial law which has become a way of life in that country."

"A visitor to Russia will see at first hand the horrible cross between the spirit and knowledge of Europe and the genius of Asia. What makes this cross more horrible still is that it can last forever because ambition and fear – the two passions which, in other countries, often ruin people by compelling them to talk too much – evoke nothing but dead silence here. This forced silence creates an illusion of artificial quiet and apparent order which are much worse than any anarchy because the discontent they cause never ends and seems perpetual."

"The Russian people, serious of necessity rather than by nature, dare to laugh only with their eyes, which express all one cannot put into words; involuntary silence makes their glances unusually meaningful and passionate. More often than not, however, their eyes are infinitely and like those of a cornered and trapped beast."

"The ferocity shown by both sides given us an inkling of what the denouement is going to be. It will hardly come too soon – in nations ruled by such methods, passions simmer for a long time before they reach the boiling point... Even our grandchildren will not see the explosion, perhaps. Nevertheless, we can predict its inevitability already today without trying to guess when exactly it will occur..."

"As I roamed the fair grounds at night, I saw brightly lit taverns, show-booths, small theatres, cafes and tea-houses. The only sound that came from all those places, illuminated with numerous lights, was a muffled din of voices. The contrast between bright illumination and the people's reserve is striking and seems positively supernatural..."

"The current political situation in Russia can be described in just a few words: it is a country whose government says what it wants because it alone has the right to speak."

"In order to survive in Russia, you should not merely conceal your thoughts – you should be capable of shamming."

"In Russia nothing is called by its proper name – words and names are only misleading. In theory, everything is so regimented that you say to yourself: 'It is impossible to live under such a regime.' In practice, there are so many exceptions to the rules, and the muddle of utterly contradictory habits and customs they cause is such that one cannot help exclaiming: 'No regime can keep such a situation under control!'"

"I left France scared by the excesses of misconceived freedom; I am going home convinced that even if not morally the purest, the representative form of government should, at any rate, be recognized as the wisest and the most moderate one. When you see it guarding the peoples from the most flagrant abuses perpetrated by other systems of government, one cannot help asking oneself: oughtn't you suppress your personal antipathy and submit, uncomplainingly, to the historical necessity which, in the end, brings more good than evil to the nations which are ripe for it?"

"When your children start grumbling at France, please use my recipe and tell them: 'Go to Russia...' It is always useful to know that there exists in the world a state where happiness is unthinkable because, by his very nature, man cannot be happy without freedom..."

In those long gone times, Marquis de Custine's book had the effect of a bomb explosion on Russia and Europe. The echo of this explosion hasn't quite died down yet. The bitter feelings it produces have come down to us through generations along with slavish mentality, the oppression of the strong and the impunity of the powers-that-be. The mirror has tarnished with time, the reflection has become blurred, the face looking back at you from the misty glass is wrinkled, the hair is grey – but it is the same face, and there is nothing you can do about it. And the book is about pre-Lenin and pre-Bolshevik Russia.

This is not a review of de Custine's book brought out by Politizdat publishers recently. I am certain that its appearance on our book market will not pass unnoticed, and that it's edition (200,000 copies) is large enough to bring the French traveller's impressions to quite a broad section of the Soviet reading public. By a strange coinci-

At the border of the Russian Empire during the days of Marquis de Custine.
Drawing by Gustave Doré

dence, 150 years ago de Custine's book about Russia in the reign of Nicholas I was published in the same edition of 200,000 copies, enormous for those times! Just in passing, in the Soviet period the book went through only one edition in 1930. It was not for nothing that strict censors kept the book well away from the public eye – analogies and parallels easily suggested themselves.

By the time he arrived in Russia, de Custine had already travelled far and wide and attained considerable renown as a writer. At the age of slightly over 20 he set out on his travels and spent the decade that followed touring England, Scotland, Switzerland and Spain. In Paris literary salons he met many Russians and, seeking new impressions and intrigued by that vast and mysterious country, Russia, he embarked on the journey in the summer of 1839.

Nicholas I knew that the French writer was coming, and waited for him. First of all, the Tsar hankered for European fame and recognition, he was certain that Russia would overwhelm the visiting Frenchman and that the latter would sing praise to the Russian Emperor and Russian life. There were more personal, covert reasons for the Tsar's interest in de Custine. Nicholas I knew that the cruel punishment meted out to the Decembrists, the bloody suppression of the Polish uprising and the death of Pushkin had come as a shock to the European public. Nicholas was sure that the visitor was favourably disposed towards him and would make a flattering account of his trip, thus relegating the tragic episodes of his reign to the background.

Those who advised the Tsar to give de Custine a cordial welcome hoped that by virtue of his origin the guest would behave towards Russian autocracy from the positions of class solidarity – after all, de Custine was a Royalist, and his family had suffered during the French Revolution.

The history of the de Custine family was a tragic one. Astolphe was born in 1790. In 1793 his grandfather, General Adam Philippe de Custine, who had sided with the Revolution, was accused of treason and guillotined. Before the execution, he managed to send word to his son (Astolphe's father) asking him to clear his good name. The son, an army officer, went to Paris and distributed leaflets there saying that the General had been slandered. He was caught and sent to the guillotine, too. Astolphe's mother was jailed but succeeded in making her getaway to a small village in Lorraine where she dedicated herself to bringing up her son.

That was where the would-be writer spent his childhood. He grew up in a family of "enemies of the people," as we would have described it. Hard trials could not but have an effect on the formation of the young man's views. Quite early in life his hatred for the murderers of his grandfather and his father was overwhelmed by a sense of independence and firm belief in the truth. As Leo Tolstoi put it, all of us are equal before death and before the truth. The reviewers of de Custine's first books of travel noted his moral integrity and truthfulness.

On board the ship which took him to St. Petersburg across the Baltic sea, Astolph met Prince Kozlovsky, a Russian. Their long talks and the Prince's revelations left de Custine disheartened. The Prince warned his travelling companion against going by first impressions and trusting the "Potyomkin" facade which was likely to be put up for his benefit; the real face of Russia, he explained, was to be found behind that facade. The Prince's discourses unnerved de Custine and he attributed them at first to the Russian grandee's jaundice. Then his Russian tour began. Day and weeks went by. The French traveller was received by the Tsar and the Tsarina, entertained at court, invited to receptions and dinners. De Custine then hit the road and visited a number of towns and villages – Nizhny Novgorod (famous for its annual Fairs, one of which was in progress at that time), Yaroslavl, Moscow. He met with convicts as they were driven past him along the Siberian highway, interviewed merchants and civil servants, observed the life of serfs and their relations with landowners.

De Custine was in no position, of course, to look too deep into the Russian reality, his discourses about the Russian history, the Russian national character and the complicated processes of Russia's social development are most subjective and, at times, simply erroneous. At the same time, many of the traveller's assessments are striking in their shrewdness and precision. Hence the lasting value of the book.

After the book came out, the Tsar, his court and "my-country-right-or-wrong" patriots went all out to cushion the effect of de Custine's notes. The author was accused of all sorts of mortal sins and even called "the father of Russophobia." Some Russian men of letters levelled devastating criticism at the "frog."

The message sent by the writer Nikolai Grech to the Third Department (the secret police) is worthy of note. "Of all the recent books about Russia," the message, addressed to Dubelt, Count Benkendorf's aide, went, "that by Marquis de Custine the rascal, is the meanest... Please get me the permission to take that book apart! I am spoiling for a fight and you may rest assured that I shall not disgrace my native land, Russia! Whatever I lack in intelligence and talent I shall make up for by my fiery love for the Sovereign and for my Motherland..."

The book was anathemized – but read, nevertheless.

Commented Alexander Hertzen: "The book acts upon me like torture, like a stone weighing heavily upon my chest; I ignore his mistakes; his basic vision is correct. That horrible society and that country are Russia."

Today de Custine's observations will hardly pass unnoticed, either, and reactions to them may vary. So what? Let's face it, many comments on Russian traditions and the Russian national character, found in the book, are rather superficial and may hurt the Russian reader's feelings. But then one can also find in it many indisputable statements which no "patriotic" verbiage can disavow.

The Russian reality made Marquis de Custine, an aristocrat and a Royalist – a liberal and a democrat. He was not embarrassed by such a radical change of views because it had come from his realism, from his adherence to the truth.

The sun of publicity which de Custine had prophetically wrote about is still shining in our Motherland. Nevertheless, ever more clouds are appearing in the sky above us. Shall we take another 150 years to see ourselves for what we really are?

What's the man eating, dad?

Lev Razgon told me once about a GULAG chief who had got a kick out of summoning emaciated concentration camp inmates to his office and eating exotic delicacies in their presence at a cloth-covered table, and mopping his mouth with napkins after a sumptuous meal. His death came as joy to the prisoners.

Recently, television (which has made socialist choice) showed us our parliament at work. As a representative of coalminers who had laid down tools and gone on a hunger strike – a man with a strong but fatigue-lined face – rose to speak, the people's representatives tried to boo him first, but then gave in. He spoke softly, to the point, and finished his grim speech with the word "Farewell." He addressed human beings like himself, God's own creatures, many of them members of the Party known as the embodiment of "the mind, honour and conscience" of our epoch. Or so it seemed to him.

While he was speaking, a waiter served glasses of vitamin-enriched milk to one of the people's leaders seated in the presidium just above the speaker. The leader sipped his milk as he listened to the man on a hunger strike. He sipped his milk in front of the whole nation brutalized by endless queues for milk, yogurt, anything, in front of the whole country where baby food rations have been cut down to a minimum. He sipped his milk with Bolshevik straightforwardness.

Television cameramen held this scene for all the nation to enjoy his straightforwardness. The other day, another well-fed leader was granting an interview. Lest he should feel tired, a lackey served him tea, lemon slices, gingerbreads and biscuits. Gazing at the screen, a little girl asked: "What's this man eating, daddy?"

She had never seen biscuits in her life.

The interviewer asked questions. He was not offered any tea. He was second-rate.

Those wretched people's elected representatives who tried to talk the hungry miner out of strike were also second-rate. The most "convincing" argument they could think of was: "We are also hard up. We are even harder up than you are. But look at us – we are not on strike!"

This is an essential part of Bolshevik mythology: the heroic people, the closely knitted family; we all want our country to prosper, we have common aims. Let us make another extra effort...

All the members of our closely-knit family are equal, but when it comes to milk some are more equal than others.

Bolshevik mentality is based on the religion of slaves and masters. The elite is chewing pastry, and the rest are applauding and waiting for crumbs. They are like sparrows waiting for a raven to finish his meal. With luck, they may get some leftovers.

As for the leaders, they eat to their hearts' content.

I have nothing against their eating habits. But how can anyone considering himself a human being gobble up food in front of the undernourished? Isn't that disgusting?

They have no moral scruples about anything any longer. They already spit profanities at TV reporters and miners. They are proud of having clutched the helm of their party.

Our leaders want the people to show some more patience. They think that 73 years of patience isn't enough. They haven't yet drunk all the milk, they haven't yet devoured all the biscuits and all the gingerbreads.

They, our leaders, no longer expect the people to make food for them. They now prefer to buy their food abroad. For gold, coal, oil and wood which belong to the people.

They want the people to cherish just one hope – a hope for crumbs from the master's dinner table.

One wise leader said that in order to prosper, we must put our lives, fates, years, hope (again!) into the heavy industry. That is, into tanks and guns. So as to sell the deadly hardware and to spend the profits on biscuits.

It is not the system but the people that are responsible for all the shortcomings, as their teaching has it. For seventy-three years those people who did not suit the system were shot. And now the Party has climbed out of the trenches. What for? To keep on shooting?

One philosopher announced the other day that Stalin was not like Hitler at all. Hitler wanted his regime to support his dictatorship in the open, and Stalin wanted his to do it on the sly. This is a big difference, of course. It was especially obvious to those shot. They certainly saw the difference between a Nazi bullet and a Communist bullet. The philosopher went on to say that Communists are not to be tried because they did not know what they were doing.

It is, he reasons, like trying American Republicans for having advocated slavery and unleashed a bloody civil war a century ago. For other philosophers like him this argument may sound convincing. The reason why I call him a philosopher is that he is preoccupied with arguments and ignores facts. As a matter of fact, he is a historian, but takes liberties with history. Today the American Democrats, now in opposition, are trying – as they did in the "Honest Abe" times – to purge the world of slave-owning regimes, while the Bolsheviks offer no other alternative to the people than slavery. They want to be Big Brothers. This is their teaching. And they do not like that the peoples are ridding themselves of communist regimes. Because, whether they like it or not, it transpires that their chieftains are all thieves, embezzlers and executionists.

There is the philosopher for you. He parades his shabby and fiercely dogmatic views without batting an eyelid. Isn't it disgusting?

It certainly is. But it is also funny.

Very much so.

Leonid Likhodeyev

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

The author requests that emoluments for his present and previous topical satires be transferred to the striking miners' fund.

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